Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times

Atlas of European Values

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Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times
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Tilburg, 2022

Colophon

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Preface

How attitudes converge and diverge, evolving over time.

The European Union is a community of values. It is a peace project, which emerged from the tragedy of war and was founded on the respect for human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. These are the fundamental values that open societies share and must defend. Societies in which we understand and see one another — all individuals — as equals, deserving of dignity. We are free to think and feel and be who we like. And we are free to change and speak our minds, because the world changes, and so do we. Europe is of course larger than the EU. But the Atlas of European Values shares the same fundamental belief as the European project: that we are united in diversity.

The Atlas has been recording Europe’s diversity since the 1980s, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is a treasure trove of information from across the entire continent, collected every nine years for scientific and educational purposes. It documents what Europeans find important in life, the major societal issues, and how attitudes converge and diverge, evolving over time. Issues such as identity, welfare, migration, sustainability, solidarity and democracy. And for the first time, with this third edition, the Atlas is open access, available to all.

In Europe’s recent history, education has been the vaccine against violence. Education is more than the knowledge of facts; it is the knowledge of values. And that is why the Atlas is so precious. This new edition poses pressing questions, like what is the basis of trust and solidarity in democratic and diverse societies.

Questions that European leaders are called to answer every day — for instance, as we built our Union’s unprecedented recovery plan, NextGenerationEU. Readers of the Atlas can position themselves in a diversity of opinions, and learn what explanations there might be for one’s own standpoints, or for the viewpoints of others. Each chapter presents maps and graphs, as well as interviews with academics and leaders, who present insights into the data.

The Atlas will surely inspire you. And I hope, as Dr. Seuss put it so well, “the more that you read, the more things you will know; the more that you learn, the more places you’ll go.” The European project, after all, is a journey, where we learn from one another and grow.

Dr. Ursula von der Leyen
President of the European Commission
Europe Day, 09/05/2022
1980: The Wall

On 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened. The Wall had been built in 1961 to isolate West-Berlin, an enclave of West-Germany, from the capital of the German Democratic Republic (East Berlin). For almost three decades, the Berlin Wall divided the two Germanies and symbolised the division of the continent. In 1990, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War led to the reunification of Germany. However, the reunification process was marked by political and social challenges, and the transition to a market economy was not smooth.

1981 - European Values Study wave 1

1981 - European Values Study wave 2

1983: Digital age

The first computers for home use were introduced, and the personal computer soon became part of the market. By 1985 and early 1986, the personal computer was named Macintosh by Apple. The internet was regarded as the start of the information age. Before the internet, information and communication technology (ICT) had revolutionised the way people communicated and worked. News and information are available almost anywhere and anytime through the world wide web and social media, which are accessible through internet and communication technology (ICT) had revolutionised the way people communicated and worked. News and information are available almost anywhere and anytime through the world wide web and social media.

1985: Yugoslav Wars

1991: Ageing continent

By 2050, the population of Europe is projected to decline by 2050. The proportion of the population aged 65 or older is expected to rise from 12% in 2015 to 21% in 2050.

2008 - European Values Study wave 4

2015: Paris Climate Accords

At the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference near Paris, France, 195 countries agreed to fight the dangerous rise in global temperatures. The Paris agreement set a target of limiting global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

2020: Coronavirus

On 24 January 2020, the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in China was reported. On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak a pandemic. Since then, COVID-19 has spread to nearly every country worldwide, with over 100 million cases and more than 2 million deaths reported. Europe was among the first regions to experience a significant increase in cases, with over 50,000 deaths recorded in the region.

2020 - Turkish crisis

The 2020 Turkish crisis involved a severe financial crisis that led to a sharp depreciation of the Turkish lira and a significant increase in inflation. The crisis was triggered by the government’s economic policies and the Central Bank’s decision to lower interest rates.

History 7/9
National pride, European doubts

**SENSE OF BELONGING**

The European continent has quite diffuse geographical limits, especially at the eastern, Asian part. Belarus and Ukraine are generally regarded as being part of Europe. And from a geographical point of view, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, but perhaps also Greenland may be considered European. How many people actually consider themselves European than Italians, while Italy has been in the Union for over sixty years and Norway never has. European identity is a complex issue.

**EUROPEAN UNIFICATION**

The European Union itself has never defined geographical limits; instead it defines itself as “an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders”, as is written in the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union. If not defined by geography, perhaps history may provide clues on European identity? The continent is often referred to as “the old world”. Its history includes the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, the rise of Christianity, the Enlightenment period, Humanism and Industrialisation. However, these transitions have not influenced all inhabitants, and not all in similar ways. In the Middle Ages, Europe’s 80 million inhabitants were scattered across 200 states, would-be states, fiefdoms and state-like organizations. And only forty years ago, Western and Eastern Europe were worlds apart, divided by an “iron curtain” during fifty years of communism in the Eastern part. Christianity may have been the major religion in Europe for two thousand years, between the years 700-1000 the entire Iberian peninsula was part of the Muslim world. And in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire stretched all the way to Athens (Greece), Budapest (Hungary) and Chișinău (Moldova). The history of a Balkan country like Bulgaria is in many aspects very different from that of a Scandinavian country like Sweden or a Southern country like Portugal. Yet, they are all seen as European while the inhabitants may have quite different ideas of what being European means.

**IN OR OUT**

In the late 1970s, social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1939-1988) introduced the term social identity: a person’s sense of who he or she is, is based on group membership(s). Humans have an inbuilt tendency to define themselves as part of a group or groups. It’s an important source of self-esteem, pride and belonging. There are numerous social groups: a social class, a professional group, a tennis club, all citizens of a town, religious ethnicity, gender, etcetera.

Human desire to belong to a group inextricably results in thinking in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. There is no in-group (‘us’) without an out-group (‘them’). And after putting ourselves in an in-group, we tend to exaggerate the differences with the out-group as well as the similarities within the in-group. The larger these are, the stronger the warm feeling of belonging. The uglier the picture of the ‘other’, the higher the self-appreciation of the in-group.

Group formation and subsequent stereotyping can occur at every level in society, warned Tajfel. From the more innocent slogans on banners of rivaling soccer teams, to harmful bullying of ‘out-siders’ in school class rooms, to xenophobia, racism and hate crimes, and even genocides.
Feeling European

The percentage of people consider themselves European.

Feeling European

European unity

EU and non-EU countries ranked according to people’s feeling of closeness to Europe.

... by generation

EU and non-EU countries ranked according to people’s feeling of closeness to Europe.
logistic problems encountered during the COVID-19-pandemic, but also because of geopolitical differences or fear of spying. Reappraisal of local politics is an important aspect of glocalisation. Although more and more laws are made at a higher level of government, local rules and policies influence people’s daily lives and welfare to a large extent. Cities and towns can make a difference in quality of life by introducing bike lanes, healthy school meals, fighting corruption and criminality, or tackling heat islets. This is reflected in the World Mayor contest: a global vote for the best local leader.

importance of global trends next to more appreciation of local and regional culture. Glocalisation is often seen as a kind of countermovement, a social movement opposed to the increasing flow across borders of labour, capital, goods and services which may lead to cultural homogenisation (‘McDonaldization’). Glocalisation also includes resistance and rebellious defence against globalisation through growing support and interest of people in local history, traditions or authentic cultures. McDonalds had to close its doors in Beijing’s Forbidden City after local protests, and a city like Venice doesn’t allow fast food chains to overtake its city centre. Furthermore, glocalisation also includes the ‘recall’ and revival of manufacturing businesses in Europe because of shortages due to logistic problems encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also because of geopolitical differences or fear of spying.

‘Think globally, act locally’ is an already cliché slogan in international business. The mantra is based on a Japanese global marketing strategy from the 1980s, which says that global products and services have more success when they are adapted to local cultures. Famous examples include McDonald’s strategy to add a local touch to its universal fast food menus. In India, you may order a McSpicy Paneer and in Italy customers can buy a cheesy, tomato-ey Panzerotti.

The Japanese marketing strategy inspired the British sociologist Roland Robertson to introduce the term ‘glocalisation’, a linguistic hybrid of globalisation and localisation, in 1992. The term encompasses the simultaneously growing importance of global trends next to more appreciation of local and regional culture. Glocalisation is often seen as a kind of countermovement, a social movement opposed to the increasing flow across borders of labour, capital, goods and services which may lead to cultural homogenisation (‘McDonaldization’). Glocalisation also includes resistance and rebellious defence against globalisation through growing support and interest of people in local history, traditions or authentic cultures. McDonald’s had to close its doors in Beijing’s Forbidden City after local protests, and a city like Venice doesn’t allow fast food chains to overtake its city centre. Furthermore, glocalisation also includes the ‘recall’ and revival of manufacturing businesses in Europe because of shortages due to logistic problems encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also because of geopolitical differences or fear of spying.

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... by education

The education gap in feeling European: the difference in percentage points between the higher and lower educated people in a country. Generally speaking, higher educated Europeans feel more closely connected to their continent. In Bulgaria, this education gap is the largest. Montenegro and Belarus are the exceptions. Here, lower educated people indicate feeling closer to Europe. Serbia is closest to the European average.

... by religiosity

The religion gap in feeling European: the difference in percentage points in feeling European between non-religious people and religious people. In many countries, such as Sweden and Italy, being religious hardly influences feeling European. In Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, non-religious people tend to have a warmer feeling towards Europe. In Poland and Spain, the opposite is true.

... by gender

The gender gap in feeling European: the difference (in percentage points) in feeling European between men and women. On average, European women do not feel more or less European than men. However, in Iceland and Switzerland, women have slightly warmer feelings towards Europe; in Portugal and Azerbaijan, men do.
Nicola Sturgeon clearly formulated her regrets and future perspective. “The UK’s exit from the EU may be marked with celebrations by some in other parts of the UK, but I am writing to you today – a very symbolic day - to send a strong message of solidarity, and of hope, to our European friends and neighbours. Scotland very much hopes to resume our membership of the European Union in the future, as an equal member.” However, a higher appreciation of the Union in regions striving to more autonomy is not evident from the European Values studies.

Within Europe and within the European Union there are regions that strive for more independence, with varying urgences. Among these are Flanders and Wallonia (‘splitting’ of Belgium), Scotland (UK), Basque country (France, Spain), Bavaria (Germany), Silesia (Poland), Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (partition).

A recent, well-known example is the Spanish autonomous region of Catalonia. In 2017, the Catalans organised a referendum on becoming an independent state, a republic. The referendum was declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Riots followed on the voting day when Spanish police forces hindered the voting and closed voting stations.

INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE UNION

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It has been put forward that the European Union may act as an alternative to the nation state for regions striving for autonomy. An example could be Scotland. 62 percent of the Scots voted against Britain leaving the EU in the Brexit referendum of 2017 (turnout: 65 percent). In a ‘letter to Europe’ on Brexit day [January 31, 2020] Scotland’s first minister Nicola Sturgeon clearly formulated her regrets and future perspective. “The UK’s exit from the EU may be marked with celebrations by some in other parts of the UK, but I am writing to you today – a very symbolic day - to send a strong message of solidarity, and of hope, to our European friends and neighbours. Scotland very much hopes to resume our membership of the European Union in the future, as an equal member.” However, a higher appreciation of the Union in regions striving to more autonomy is not evident from the European Values studies.
Willingness to fight for one’s country

The percentage of people who are willing to fight for their country.

... over the years

The rise or fall (in percentage points) in the willingness to fight for one’s country since 1990. In most countries, the citizens’ willingness to fight decreased, but not in France, Germany and Italy.

Searching for the ‘true’ European

A ‘true European’ ...

The percentage of people who feel that being Christian, having European ancestors or adapting to European culture is (very) important for being considered European.

... is Christian

... has European ancestors

... embraces European culture
Struggling with unification

A EUROPEAN REPUBLIC?
The US and the EU are easily named together and compared as both represent a major western economic force. However, where the United States of America has been a firmly established federation for over two hundred years, the European Union is much younger and although it has federation-like features, the term federation is often shied away from by the Union itself. Members are tied by a single economic market, and the Union has supranational institutions and laws. Yet, countries tend to stress their national laws and sovereignty. Each member has its own tax laws, social security system, voting procedures, anti-COVID-19 strategy, army or police force, asylum rules, etcetera. If it is not (economically) necessary or beneficiary to equalise laws, countries are not eager to do so.

On the contrary, German historian and philosopher Ulrike Guérot, founder and Director of the European Democracy Lab (EDL), is an ardent advocate of the European Republic. “We have come 2/3rds of the way”, she argues. “We have a single market, a single currency, now we need a single democracy. […] The European Republic stands for the political equality for all European citizens and a full-fledged #EuropeanCitizenship”. She advocates to shift the paradigm in unification from states to citizens, and calls upon European citizens to make the European Republic come true. Her manifesto, also outlined in her book Why Europe should become a republic (2019), shows strong support for further unification and ‘more Europe’ as a means to protect European prosperity and values.
Being a European in Bulgaria and Sweden

A 'true' European abides the laws and has a European way of life. Bulgarians and Swedes agree. However, in Bulgaria a European has European ancestors and is Christian. For the Swedes these latter characteristics are far from essential. EVS Programme Directors Georgy Fotev (Bulgaria) and Stefan Dahlberg (Sweden) share their thoughts.

Bulgarians consider ancestry highly important for being European, why?

Georgy Fotev: “Bulgaria lies at a very windy geostrategic position in the Balkans, and at the border of Europe and the Muslim world. Our history is full of turbulence, wars and changes, providing a permanent almost traumatic uncertainty. Of course, there is no country without conflicts in its history, but feelings of instability and insecurity are still strongly present in today’s Bulgaria. Decoupling one’s identity from history and location, deterritorialisation, results in homelessness in the metaphorical sense of the word. That is perceived as a treat by many Bulgarians. House and home are highly connected, and home is a supreme value in Bulgaria.”

Swedes do not consider ancestry important for being European, why?

Stefan Dahlberg: “Sweden has stood out as the least nativistic country in the whole of Europe as long as surveys date back. Why? That is a big and complex question. It certainly has to do with Sweden being a social welfare state and its high level of interpersonal trust. All Scandinavian societies are characterized as open and tolerant, and by a high sense of social equity. In Sweden it is broadly perceived as a treat by many Bulgarians. House and home are highly connected, and home is a supreme value in Bulgaria.”

Why is being Christian (not) important?

“Sweden is a highly secularised country”, continues Dahlberg. “Religion is considered a private matter. Publicly wearing religious symbols, for example, is ‘not done’. It will raise eyebrows.” Fotev: “The share of Bulgarians who link European identity to Christianity, about seventy percent, reflects the number of Christians in the country. Under the atheistic totalitarian-communist regime of the Soviet Union, religion was suppressed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we witnessed a revival in religiosity. Perhaps, secularisation will start in the next decades like it has in many other European countries.”

Do you think the ideas about being European in Bulgaria and Sweden will converge?

Fotev: “My grandfather never saw the world outside his town. I could travel as far as Moscow during the communist regime, but the West was inaccessible for most of my life. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, everything changed. Luckily, Bulgarians can travel much further for work, studies and holidays today, and there is the digital world with no borders. Getting to know each other is a first step in overcoming differences. Yet, identity is a multi-layered, complex issue.” Dahlberg: “The Scandinavian model, the open, progressive society, is under pressure. The picture of the perfect society totters. Getting to know each other is a first step in overcoming differences. Yet, identity is a multi-layered, complex issue.”

The importance of some features for being considered truly Bulgarian or truly Swedish in the two respective countries.

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The level of confidence in the EU in EU and non-EU countries.

... in EU and non-EU countries

The percentage of people with confidence in the EU in EU and non-EU countries ranked according to the duration of their EU-membership.

... over the years

The percentage of people with confidence in the EU since 1990 in some EU countries. Great Britain left the EU in 2020.

... by region

The percentage of people who have no confidence in the EU in different regions of Great Britain.

... by generation

The percentage of Brits who have no confidence in the EU by generation.

... by educational level

The percentage of Brits who have no confidence in the EU by educational level.
“Identity is a major freedom that seems to be jeopardised, today”

“Identity is only an issue when there is an identity crisis,” says French social scientist Nathalie Heinich. However, rather than a worldwide identity crisis, Heinich sees a lot of misunderstanding and misinterpretations of what identity is. “Identity is often distorted for political reasons, while it is a wonderful intellectual tool for explaining and understanding societies.”

Identity is as old as humanity itself. Since time immemorial, all humans all have a name and identify themselves as being a part of a family or tribe, a neighbourhood, a country, a professional community, or other groups. Nonetheless, it seems like the world has just discovered identity. The term turns up in news papers, in talk shows, and in debates on globalisation, migration, rising nationalism and populism, and but also in LGBTQI+, gender, BLM and #MeToo discussions.

Ever since Nathalie Heinich started her academic career in the 1980s, identity has been a recurring topic in her work. To share her knowledge on and collected insights into the concept, but also to clarify and tackle the misconceptions she noticed in the public debate, she published a much-acclaimed essay entitled Ce que n’est pas l’identité (“What identity is not”). To grasp the full concept of identity that she presents, takes an intellectual effort. Identity, for example, is neither factual, nor an illusion, partly inborn, partly acted and partly given, and it depends on contexts such as time, place and company. Moreover identity is not easy to observe: it is only noticeable when it is ‘under attack’.

What misconceptions about identity do you see today?

A main problem is that identity tends to be conceived and presented, mainly by politicians, as something that is substantial – as something objective that you either have or do not have. In reality, one’s identity is the result of a threefold process. One step is someone’s self-perception, a feeling of being or belonging. Then there is the step of presenting oneself to others as being that someone. Acted and partly given, and it depends on contexts such as time, place and company. Moreover identity is not easy to observe: it is only noticeable when it is ‘under attack’.

Can you give an example?

Right-wing politicians use identity as an argument for xenophobia, for excluding and rejecting individuals because they don’t have a particular national or local identity. That’s not new, of course, although the word ‘identity’ has not always been used in this context. On the political left side, identity is used to foster communitarian positions, the idea that people deserve recognition and specific civic rights on the basis of belonging to a community, in particular to minority communities such as coloured people, gays and lesbians, Muslims, etcetera. Thus, identity is used for two very opposite purposes: on the one side for defence of a majority position, and on the other side for the defence of minority positions.

Both, I think, are not the right way.

How could another notion of identity improve things?

Identity is not only a tool to fight for or to ask, but can be a tool for understanding. Rather than wondering whether people have a certain identity, one could examine under which conditions and in what contexts people feel this identity and present themselves in that way. Identity is not factual, but a process, not absolute, but relative, and something which is partly but not totally determined by oneself. It’s an error to think that identity is something stable and given once and for all, as much as it is a mistake to think that identity is totally relative and something you can change as you wish. That is a highly individualistic and rather absurd conception.

We cannot completely modify all components of what we call identity, think for example of gender, or the colour of our skin, or accent.

Identity can cause genocide as the Srebrenica massacre during the Yugoslav Wars showed. Does the strength of the concept sometimes scare you?

Fifty years ago, we probably would have said nationalism instead of identity. Indeed, identity can be used to disconnect people, to make people reject and dehumanise others on the basis of ancestry or ethnicity. However, identity itself is neither good nor bad; it all depends on the way it is used, just like honour, for example. Honour can be something wonderful which helps people to be more diligent, act more ethically, show more hospitality, and so on. Yet, there are also horrible ‘honour crimes’. People are killed in the name of honour, too.

There is a lot of debate on European identity; whether it exists, and if there is a lack of it. ‘What do you think’?

You cannot say that there exists a European identity in general; there are situations in which we more or less feel European. For example, when I go to America, I can feel European there, but not when I’m in Paris. If I had to make a survey on European identity, I would ask people: ‘do you remember situations in which you felt a European, do you remember situations in which you presented yourself as a European, and do you remember situations in which you were designated as a European?’ You need to analyse identity in the concrete, actual context. Asking ‘do you feel European’? is a kind of political wish; it’s not the actual experience of individuals.

You feel European in the US. What makes that European identity? In the US, I’m often shocked by the very communitarian mind; people who say ‘as a woman I …’, or ‘as a black person I ..’. That is not my way of thinking, I’m more a universalist. However, is that really European or French? Europe is not at all homogenous on this issue.

Does unification require a European identity?

For unification, we need European institutions and European laws. European identity may follow. Europeans travel a lot these days and we share a currency, initiatives that will probably foster European feelings. However, you can foster but not force identity. Please note: nobody is obliged to feel European, nor French, nor Dutch, or whatever. Identity belongs to the personal freedom of people.

That is highly important. Identity is a major freedom that seems to be jeopardised today. For example, I’m a feminist and I have always been one. However, some movements - neo-feminists or new feminist as they call themselves - want all feminists to prioritise being a woman under all circumstances. For example, I should answer your questions first of all as a woman, as a victim of men and patriarchy. To me that is absurd, even if it is for the best reasons because discrimination exists and needs to be resolved. However, at the moment, I’m first of all a scientist or sociologist; reducing my identity in any situation to being a woman is an offence to my freedom.

Is there a link to the number of ‘identities one can collect’?

Multiple identities are only a problem when they cause conflict. When you are a border guard facing someone who’s dreaming, you don’t ask yourself: what is this person’s nationality? He or she is a human being and you are a human being: we have a duty to help, regardless of whether you are for example Greek or Turkish. However, being a human doesn’t mean you have the duty to let this person enter your territory.

Were you surprised by any of the charts and graphs about identity in this Atlas?

I’m at ease interpreting the data, because I’m not a supporter of the kind of surveys that the European Values Study uses. Did people answer the questions on the basis of what they have actually experienced, or on the basis of what they think they should experience? Yes, I know, all questions are asked in all countries in the same way to a representative number of citizens. However, I believe that these general questionnaires have major methodical flaws: they can hardly take the context into account, and they mix up what I call ‘private’ and ‘public’ values without any possible control of the shifts between the two. I prefer to observe actual situations where people value things or act according to the identity being examined. That is my way of studying sociology and identity.

Nathalie Heinich, Senior Researcher, CNRS, Paris

26 / Identity

What identity is ...
• Neither ‘rightist’ nor ‘leftist’
• Not an objective fact
• Not an illusion
• Not independent of context
• Not limited to national identity
• Not a question of assimilation or differentiation
• Not monolithic, but plural

Only manifest when it has become a problem (no identity crisis)

From Nathalie Heinich: Ce que n’est pas l’identité (2018)
National versus European voting

The gap in voting readiness in national and European elections (in percentage points). In Sweden, the gap is largest: far more people always vote in national elections than in European elections. On the contrary, more Lithuanians and Slovaks vote in European elections than in national elections.

EU membership support

The percentage of people who think that EU membership is a ‘good thing’.

EU membership: beneficial or not?

The percentage of people who think that their country has profited from EU membership and those who think it did not.

FUTURE EU MEMBERS

In 2013, Croatia became the latest new, 28th member of the European Union. However, on 31 January 2020, Great Britain left the Union, resulting in again 27 members. The earliest next enlargement is not expected before 2025, considering the progress in accession negotiations with the current five candidate countries. Negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia are most advanced. Yet, even if negotiations proceed successfully, the Union might be reluctant to grant access. France and other states have argued that the EU must first resolve internal challenges before it is ready for further enlargement.

When a country wishes to join the EU, it must meet its ‘Copenhagen criteria’. These accession criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intentions of the EU. It’s a long procedure to bring laws and institutions in line with minimum EU requirements.

Currently there are five official candidate countries:

• Serbia (applied for membership in 2009) - accession negotiations have started in 2014 and are in progress
• Montenegro (applied for membership in 2008) - accession negotiations have started in 2012 and are in progress
• North Macedonia (applied for membership in 2004) - decision to start accession talks was taken in 2020. The accession process was delayed because of a dispute with Greece on the country’s name, which has now been changed into North Macedonia.
• Albania (applied for membership in 2003) - decision to start accession talks was taken in 2020. However, talks haven’t begun because Albania follows a parallel time schedule with North Macedonia.
• Turkey (applied for membership in 1989) - official candidate since 1999 - accession negotiations started in 2005 but are on hold because of unresolved differences over human rights.

EU expansion

The opinions on further expansion of the European Union. Should the EU grow further or has expansion already gone too far? EU and non-EU countries are shown separately.

When a country wishes to join the EU, it must meet its ‘Copenhagen criteria’. These accession criteria require that a state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intentions of the EU. It’s a long procedure to bring laws and institutions in line with minimum EU requirements.

Currently there are five official candidate countries:

• Serbia (applied for membership in 2009) - accession negotiations have started in 2014 and are in progress
• Montenegro (applied for membership in 2008) - accession negotiations have started in 2012 and are in progress
• North Macedonia (applied for membership in 2004) - decision to start accession talks was taken in 2020. The accession process was delayed because of a dispute with Greece on the country’s name, which has now been changed into North Macedonia.
• Albania (applied for membership in 2003) - decision to start accession talks was taken in 2020. However, talks haven’t begun because Albania follows a parallel time schedule with North Macedonia.
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Diversity in values and priorities

How importance in life is ...

- religion
  The percentage of people who find religion (very) important in life.

- work
  The percentage of people who find work (very) important in life.

- politics
  The percentage of people who find politics (very) important in life.
Work or leisure
The gap (in percentage points) between the importance of work and leisure. Albanians consider work considerably more important in life than leisure. The Brits and Dutch emphasise the importance of leisure.

... over the years
The percentage of people who consider leisure time (very) important in life in 1990 and 2017. Leisure is valued more in recent years.

Secularisation
The fall or rise in the importance of religion in life since 1990 (in percentage points). Bulgarians value religion considerably more today than in 1990, but in most European countries secularisation continues.

Justified or not?
The percentage of people who consider abortion, euthanasia or homosexuality sometimes or always justified.
Acceptance over the years ...

... of euthanasia
The acceptance of euthanasia since 1990. Shown is the percentage of people who consider euthanasia sometimes or always justified in five European countries.

... of abortion
The acceptance of abortion since 1990. Shown is the percentage of people who consider abortion sometimes or always justified in five European countries.

... of homosexuality
The acceptance of homosexuality since 1990. Shown is the percentage of people who consider homosexuality sometimes or always justified in five European countries.

Belief in ...
The percentage of people who believe in God, life after death, heaven and hell. Shown are the three countries with the least and most believers, as well as the most average country. For comparison, a number of non-European countries are also displayed.

... God

... life after death

... heaven

... hell

Attending service
The frequency of attending service at a church, mosque, or other house of worship.

Never
Sometimes
Often
### Cultural unity?

**CULTURAL MAP OF EUROPE**

How much do values differ in Europe? And are differences increasing or decreasing? For an answer to these questions, the results of the European Values Study are condensed into a two-dimensional ‘cultural map’, mimicking the Inglehart-Welzel World Cultural Map. On these maps, each country is represented by a single dot or square.

The vertical dimension (y-axis) of the map reflects how traditional or modern a country is. A negative score on this dimension means that people emphasise traditional values, they treasure the ‘nuclear family’ (father, mother, children), religion, and patriotism and show and demand respect for authority. A positive score reflects non-religious, law- and ration-based values held by modern people in secular societies. They emphasise individual freedom and personal life choices. Typical disagreements between traditional and modern societies concern issues such as abortion, divorce or traditional and modern values are more prevalent in agrarian, rural societies, while secular-rational values prevail in urban, industrialised areas.

The second, horizontal dimension (x-axis) on the values map reflects the level of post-modernisation of a society. People in countries that score low on this dimension emphasise survival values: hard work and economic and physical security. These societies are generally characterised by low levels of trust, intolerance towards out-groups and low support for gender equality. At the other end of this dimension are self-expression and individual wellbeing. People embrace equal rights for women and gay marriage, and put less focus on material possessions. Post-modernisation, like the term implies, follows modernisation. Security in life thanks to high economic development stimulates a focus on individual expression and well-being.

**Value changes**

Wealth is one of the major predictors of a country’s position on the cultural map. Economic developments tend to move countries to the upper-right quadrant. This position represents a focus on individual freedom and expression, high societal trust and tolerance. All Scandinavian countries and most prosperous North-West European countries are located here. Sweden, Norway and Denmark are the ‘front runners’, these countries have advanced most in the direction of self-expression and secular-rational values, also on a worldwide scale. They are on the cutting edge of modernity and post-modernity, and may set the example of future societies.

It may not surprise that Southern European countries, well-known for their family culture, family traditions and religiosity, appear on the bottom part of the cultural map. Spain is an exception; this country is found in the top right quadrant today. In most Eastern European countries, survival values dominate and societies are more traditional. The direction in which values change in these Eastern European countries varies. Poland and Slovenia moved north-eastwards in the direction of more western cultures over the past decades, whereas Bulgaria moves in the opposite direction. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic appear to stay put.

Wealth is an important, but certainly not the only factor that affects a country’s position on the cultural map. Although economic development continues, the ‘journey in north-eastern direction’ of some wealthy countries has stopped or was even reversed over the past decades. Furthermore, the traditional cultures of the Caucasus appear to be highly stable while urbanisation and industrialisation (modernisation) are ongoing.

**Important factors opposing modernisation and post-modernisation are feelings of insecurity, fear, or alienation. Today, these feelings may be the result of globalisation, economic crises, the rise of flexible labour contracts, climate change, or migration. These (perceived) threats can cause a return of traditional and ‘survival’ values. The rise of nationalist and populist movements fits this trend of cultural turnaround or backlash.**

---

*Europe’s cultural map*

Each dot represents a country’s culture in two dimensions: modernisation (y-axis; traditional versus secular-rational values) and post-modernisation (x-axis; emphasis on survival versus self-expression). Countries in Europe are shown in purple, six non-European countries in pink have been added as a reference.
**Cultural trends**

The position in 1990 and in 2017 of a number of European countries on the cultural map. Some non-European countries are also shown (open dots/squares) for comparison. Most countries shift towards more modernisation and post-modernisation over time. Bulgaria (BG) and Russia (RU) are exceptions to this trend.

**Generation gap?**

The position on the cultural map of the eldest (Silent Generation) and youngest (Generation Z) generation for a selection of countries. In Sweden and Azerbaijan differences in values between the generations are small, but in some other countries there appears to be a generation gap.

**Modemisation and post-modernisation**

The levels of modernisation and post-modernisation in 1990 and in 2017. The trend in modernisation (traditional versus secular/rational values) is shown in the bar chart on the left. The trend in post-modernisation (emphasis on survival versus self-expression) is shown in the bar chart on the right. A higher score means less traditional values (left) or more emphasis on self-expression (right).
Welfare and well-being

One of the ultimate goals of any government is the well-being of its people. Aristotle and later the Epicureans already argued that the pursuit of happiness is an important goal for people and government. The Enlightenment and positive thinking stressed the idea of the ‘makeable world’: to improve society to reach the ultimate goal of a society in which man would find happiness. Welfare and well-being are assumed to be strongly related concepts and therefore a major goal of governmental policies is to improve, in both a material and immaterial sense, the quality of people’s lives. For example, the modern welfare state guarantees several fundamental rights that apply to all citizens and seeks solutions to the needs and problems of its citizens. In general, people in Europe are quite happy and satisfied with their lives. The World Happiness Report shows that nine out of ten countries in their Happiness Top-10 are European, with Finland being the most happy country in the world. It is commonly found that people in rich societies are happier and more satisfied with their lives than people in poor societies. However, this does not imply that economic growth increases levels of happiness and satisfaction. This is known as the Easterlin Paradox.

The Easterlin Paradox states that at a point in time happiness varies directly with income both among and within nations, but over time happiness does not trend upward as income continues to grow. There is worldwide support for the Easterlin Paradox: A higher long-term growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not accompanied by a statistically (or economically) significant higher growth rate of happiness. This nil relationship holds separately for developed, transition, and less developed countries. Easterlin explained this paradox by the mechanism of habituation or adaptation: more money means higher expectations and aspirations to be satisfied.

Happiness and satisfaction in life depends on welfare

The percentage of people who are happy taking all things together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Happiness</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>60 - 64 %</td>
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<td>65 - 69 %</td>
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<td>70 - 74 %</td>
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<td>85 - 89 %</td>
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<td>90 - 94 %</td>
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The European Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples

Article 3.1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union
Happiness

Happiness in five European countries and five large countries worldwide.

... over the years

The trend in happiness since 1990. Shown is the percentage of people who are happy taking all things together in life.

... by generation

The percentage of people within various generations who are happy taking all things together in life. The least and most happy countries are shown. In Germany happiness is close to the European average.

Happiness in midlife with or without children

Do children bring happiness in life? Shown is the gap in happiness between men and women in midlife (30-60 years) with and without children (in percentage points). In Bulgaria, men and women with children are much happier. Only in Romania, Estonia and Austria, people without children are happier, especially the women.

Life satisfaction

The average score on life satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10

Happy children

A commission of the World Health Organization, Unicef and medical science journal The Lancet composed a ranking of countries in which children flourish optimally. Countries high on the ranking invest in children’s health, education, and development, and value sustainability and equity. European countries dominate the Top 10.

Life satisfaction and GDP

Countries are ranked according to their satisfaction with life in blue. The purple line represents a country’s wealth, as measured by GDP per capita. The average score on life satisfaction is positively related to country’s level of welfare.

Life satisfaction by income

The percentage of people who are satisfied with their lives for different income levels. People with high levels of income are more often satisfied with their lives than people with low levels of income.

Life satisfaction and locus of control

The average score on locus of control on a scale of 1 to 10 (x-axis) versus the average score on life satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 10 (y-axis). Life satisfaction is positively correlated with locus of control. Thus, in countries where people have more control over their lives, individuals are more satisfied.

In control

The degree of control that people experience over their life.

1. Quite or a great deal of control
2. Neutral
3. No or little control

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

Ruut Veenhoven, an expert in happiness and life satisfaction research, explored the impact of several factors on the levels of happiness and satisfaction worldwide and concluded that ‘opportunity to choose’ and the ‘capability to choose’ are among the strongest predictors of satisfaction and happiness. Both aspects are linked to the concept of locus of control: the degree of perceived control that individuals have over choice. Modern, prosperous, globalised societies offer far more opportunities and alternatives to choose from than traditional and less wealthy societies. The autonomous individual in modern, highly individualized societies is not only aware of the alternatives, but also more open and more capable to accept these alternatives. Freedom of choice thus means that individuals are allowed and able to choose the life that fits them best and to avoid situations which makes them unhappy.
In Georgia, nine in ten people want more income equality in their country; in Denmark, this applies to one in two. This may seem only logical considering the actual differences in incomes. Denmark has one of the most flat income distributions in the world, while in Georgia differences are comparable with Italy or Spain. A talk with the EVS Programme Directors in both countries, Morten Fredriksen and Merab Pachulia, learns that the desire for inequality is much more than a simple calculation. In Georgia, it is about jobs for survival; in Denmark, people treasure their non-segregated society.

Denmark is one of the countries with the world’s lowest levels of income inequality. How did this come about?

Morten Fredriksen: “Denmark never was an industrial country. Farmers and working class united against the elites contrary to the classical divide of industrialists versus labourers in most of Europe. Consequently, the elite was never strong enough to ‘break’ the workers and farmers. Instead of conflicts, compromises were sought; the elites provided health care and housing. This equity is still found in today’s society, financially as well as socially. Taxes are high and there is broad access to social benefits, housing and schools. Although there is no official minimum wage, there are few ‘working poor’ because almost all sectors are strongly unified.”

What’s income distribution like in Georgia?

Merab Pachulia: “First of all, the level of income is much lower than in Western Europe. Just one percent of the current 3.7 million Georgians has an income above 50,000 Euros. Approximately 800,000 Georgians currently live off state benefits of about one hundred Euros monthly because they are unemployed or unable to work. Many people have been internally displaced due to Russian occupation. And 23 percent of our country is not under government control; 300,000 people had to flee their homes.”

People want more income inequality. Why?

Pachulia: “The last 25 years, the number one problem in Georgia has been and still is: jobs. All surveys point out that jobs are our main priority, all through the many troubles the country has faced: the transition to a market economy, government changes, corruption scandals, a Russian invasion and occupation. It’s difficult to find a job in Georgia, even when you are young and well educated. Many work abroad today, supporting their families here. Since the late 1980s, the population has shrunk by 1.7 million.”

“In Denmark, I would say that a demand for more equality is foremost a desire to retain social equality,” tells Fredriksen. “When Danish people travel abroad, to China or the US for example, they are often shocked by the social segregation. People with different social economic backgrounds seem to live in different worlds. Here, the elite is conspicuous in its inconspicuousness. There is very little distance and people appreciate that. I have friends from different backgrounds, almost every Dane has.”

Do you think in future waves the demand for equality will change?

Fredriksen: “Not much. In turbulent economic times the support may increase a little.” Pachulia: “When more jobs become available, the support for personal incentive may rise. Personally, I would like to see more economic dynamics and incentives. People shy away from investments because of all uncertainties at the eastern border of Europe. Joining the EU would certainly help and is a high aspiration among the Georgians. We may be on the other end of Europe than Portugal, but we feel European, not Asian.”

Morten Fredriksen

Merab Pachulia
A shift in priorities: from necessity to personal development

Postmaterialism and welfare

Each dot represent a country’s position on two dimensions: the GDP per capita from the World Bank (x-axis) and the percentage postmaterialists (y-axis).

WORK: NECESSITY OR PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT?

Security and economic welfare are considered important drivers of values and value changes. For many people, a key condition for security and economic welfare is work. However, work is not only a necessity in life, providing income, it also can be a basis for personal development growth. Work may have different meanings for people. For some people, work has a negative connation, work is a means to personal development and self-unfolding. In case work comes with a negative connation, work is a means of achieving goals that are mainly outside or external to work. Therefore, this orientation is referred to as the extrinsic or ‘instrumental’ work orientation. It stresses the importance of interesting work in work orientation because it emphasizes the importance of interesting work in which people can take initiative, own responsibility, and use their capacities to achieve something.

The exact job content is thus considered of less importance. In contrast, intrinsic work orientation emphasizes that the aim of working is found in the work itself: work is the means to personal development and growth. It is also labeled ‘expressive’ work orientation because it emphasizes the importance of interesting work in which people can take initiative, own responsibility, and use their capacities to achieve something.

... by generation
Percentage of people who classify as postmaterialist, materialist or mixed.

... by income
Percentage of people who classify as postmaterialist, materialist or mixed.

Materialism and postmaterialism

Percentage of people who classify as postmaterialist, materialist or mixed (category in-between). Large majorities in Europe appear neither pure materialist nor pure postmaterialist, but mixed.

Postmaterialism and welfare

Each dot represent a country’s position on two dimensions: the GDP per capita from the World Bank (x-axis) and the percentage postmaterialists (y-axis).

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These older generations are gradually replaced by younger generations who have been raised and socialised in affluent societies and whose priorities are not materialistic but postmaterialistic. However, postmaterialists are not ‘non-materialistic’, the satisfaction of their materialistic needs is simply not a priority.

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Most important aspect of a job

Aspect of job mentioned most often as being important. In all countries, a good pay or achieving something was rated as most important.

Good work hours, using initiative, generous holidays or having a responsible job were not considered as most important aspects of a job.

The importance over time of...

... extrinsic work qualities

The importance of extrinsic work qualities (good pay, good hours and generous holidays) over time in Czechia, France, Sweden and Slovenia. In all four countries, the importance of extrinsic job qualities fluctuates over time but in general increased over the period 1990-2017.

... intrinsic work qualities

The importance of intrinsic work qualities (using initiative, achieving something and having a responsible job) over time in Czechia, France, Sweden and Slovenia. In all four countries, the importance of intrinsic job qualities also fluctuates over time, but in general increased in Czechia, France and Slovenia in the period 1990-2017, whereas in Sweden, it slightly decreased.

Work or leisure time

The percentage of people who consider work important minus the percentage of people who consider leisure time important.

Good pay and achieve something

The percentages of people who consider good pay (left side) and achieve something (right side) important aspects of a job.

Important aspects of a job.

Achieving something

Good pay

Consider good pay (right side) and achieve something (left side) as most important aspects of a job.

The percentages of people who consider work important minus the percentage of people who consider leisure time important.
More or less welfare state?

Trust in social security system

The percentage of people who have confidence in the social security system in their country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Color</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 - 35%</td>
<td>Light blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 45%</td>
<td>Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 55%</td>
<td>Dark blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 65%</td>
<td>Maroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - 75%</td>
<td>Red</td>
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LEGITIMISATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL?
Each member state of the European Union has developed its own welfare state, leading to more or less inclusive welfare state models. Nevertheless, these distinct national welfare states appear to share many common features, making some scholars talk about a ‘European Social Model’. However, all national welfare state policies are challenged by various contemporary social issues such as ageing populations and decreasing work forces. Public debates therefore often center around the question who should get what and why. People’s opinions of deservingness, state interference, and other welfare related topics are important because governments need support to legitimize their social policies.
Individual versus state responsibility

The average score on whether individuals should take more responsibility for themselves (1) or whether the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (10).

4.0 - 4.5
4.5 - 5.0
5.0 - 5.5
5.5 - 6.0
6.0 - 6.5
6.5 - 7.0

Responsibility and prosperity
Countries are ranked according to whether individuals should take more responsibility for themselves (1) or whether the state should take more responsibility (10) in blue bars. The purple line represents a country’s wealth, as measured by GDP per capita.

Individual responsibility best
• Man
• Older
• High level of education
• Higher income
• Healthy
• Bulgaria
• Estonia

The individualist
Characteristics of Europeans who think individual responsibility is best.

... by gender

... by income

Individual versus state responsibility —
Percentage of people who think that individuals should take more responsibilities for themselves (scores 1-4), whether the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (scores 7-10) or with a neutral position (scores 5-6).

... by income
Levelling incomes

The percentage of people who prefer to equalise incomes, who take a neutral position, and who prefer greater incentives for individual effort.

Good or harmful competition

The average score on whether competition is good (1) or whether it is harmful (10).

Levelling incomes and inequality

Countries are ranked according to the percentage of people who find it important for society to eliminate income inequalities in blue bars. The purple line represents income inequality, as measured by the Gini-coefficient.
The importance of recognizing people on their merits

The average score on whether it is not at all important (1) or very important (4) for society to recognize people on their merits. All countries score relatively high on importance.

- Not at all important
- Not important
- Quite important
- Very important

... by generation

The percentage of people who think it is (not) important to recognize people on their merits.

Not at all important
Not important
Quite important
Very important

Equal chances in life and meritocratic principles

MERIT AS THE BASIS FOR SUCCESS

Some individuals reach higher positions in society than others, and because of this, they earn higher incomes and have more status. Most people do not find these inequalities problematic, as long as the chances to reach these higher positions are equally distributed in society. Such a call for equal chances is also part of the principles of meritocracy.

A meritocracy is a society in which social success is determined by individual ‘merit’ or achievement and not by ascription: characteristics attributed to someone based on their socioeconomic or ethnic background or gender. The term meritocracy was coined by Michael Young, who wrote a satirical essay in 1958 in which he described a future United Kingdom in which intelligence and merit have become key in society.

A meritocracy is regarded by many people as effective since the talents and capacities of all citizens are optimally utilised. Individuals end up in a position that suits them best and in this way can make the greatest possible contribution to social welfare. In addition, a meritocratic society is viewed as fair: it is an ‘open’ society, in which everyone has an equal chance of social success.

However, a meritocracy has its downsides as well. Young himself described meritocratic society to be a dystopia in which those who have merit harden into a new elite class while those who have not end up in an underclass that is blamed for its social failure.

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The importance of recognizing people on their merits in 1999 and 2017

The average score on whether it is not at all important (1) or very important (4) for society to recognize people on their merits in 1999 and 2017. In the Czech Republic, importance declined the most while Italy shows the strongest increase in importance.
Fraud and corruption

Claiming state benefits illegally
The average score on whether people do not justify (1) or do justify (10) claiming state benefits they are not entitled to.

Accepting a bribe
The average score on whether people do not justify (1) or do justify (10) accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.

Not paying your fare on public transport
The average score on whether people do not justify (1) or do justify (10) avoiding a fare on public transport.

Tax fraud
The average score on whether people do not justify (1) or do justify (10) cheating on tax.

Acceptance of bribery and corruption

Each dot represents a country’s position on two dimensions: Corruption Perceptions Index (x-axis) and acceptance of bribery (y-axis).

Fraud and corruption

Equal life chances for men and women

Despite much progress in the field of gender equality, women’s life chances are not the same as those of men in Europe. Even in the most advanced European countries, women and girls face disadvantages and are discriminated against in education, labour market, and political representation, with negative consequences for the development of their human capital and their position in society. To give but only one example: there still exists a significant wage gap between men and women. Part of this gap can be explained by men and women occupying different positions in the labour market: men are more often employed in managerial and supervising positions, and work in sectors of industry that pay higher wages. However, occupational segregation is not the whole story. Even women who work in the same job and sector as their male counterparts, are, on average, paid less than men.

Although the principle of equal pay for men and women for equal work or work of equal value has been enshrined in EU treaties and in national laws, gender-based pay discrimination continues to exist, mostly through implicit mechanisms. Finally, societal norms about gender roles make that women are more involved in caregiving, housework, and other unpaid responsibilities than men, with consequences for their earnings.

Characteristics of Europe’s biggest tax cheats and most obedient taxpayers.

Biggest tax cheats
- Younger
- Man
- Low level of education
- Higher income
- Not religious

Most obedient taxpayers
- Older
- Woman
- High level of education
- Lower income
- Religious
University education more important for boys than girls

The percentage of people who agree that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl.

- 0 - 5 %
- 6 - 10 %
- 11 - 15 %
- 16 - 20 %
- 21 - 25 %
- 25 - 30 %

Support of gender equality norms

Percentage of people who agree with gender equality norms.

- 41 - 50 %
- 51 - 60 %
- 61 - 70 %
- 71 - 80 %
- 81 - 90 %
- 91 - 100 %

Gender equality norms and gender pay gap

Countries are ranked according to their agreement with gender equality norms in blue. The purple line represents the gender pay gap: the differences between men’s and women’s wages in percentages.

... by gender
Agreement with the statement that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl.

... by religion
Agreement with the statement that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl.

... by education
Agreement with the statement that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl.
The welfare state is the best insurance for prosperity. The highest labour participation levels and productivity rates are found in Europe’s most comprehensive welfare states, allowing for a robust passage through the Great Recession. “The modern welfare state is not simply a redistributive device; it is foremost about equipping as many people as possible with good health, skills and opportunities”, says Anton Hemerijck. Europe is one of the most prosperous regions in the world. Its wealth is shared among a relatively large group - extreme poverty exists, but it is rare - and its increase is accompanied by high levels of life satisfaction and happiness. All European countries are welfare states, although to different degrees. Citizens can rely on financial support when they are unemployed, on affordable medical care through collective health insurance, and on a state pension for when they retire. Despite these assets, there is a worry that Europe’s welfare prosperity is at risk. The continent’s population is ageing, financial and economic crises occur, robots may replace jobs, and climate action is costly. Will the next generation also benefit from the welfare-based frame, but a false necessity. I would say that the welfare state is the best insurance for future prosperity in Europe’s ageing societies and knowledgeable economies.

Is the welfare state a European invention? The welfare state developed after World War II as a policy response to mass unemployment and deep poverty during the 1930s, the Great Depression. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, all countries with long Christian and socialist traditions in organised solidarity, started to set up pensions and social insurance systems. After 1945, also the US expanded the welfare state, at a faster pace than Europe, also because the US were more prosperous in the 1950s and 1960s, in the wake of the stagflation recession, and with the transition to a post-industrial economy, the welfare state was criticised and became subject to structural reform. Today, the share of money spent on welfare systems across Europe is at the same level as it was in the 1930s, yet the focus has changed from a passive safety net to an activating policy instrument. Meanwhile the US welfare state was retrenched. Europe stands proud to harbour a passive safety net to an activating policy instrument. Meanwhile the welfare state was criticised and became subject to structural reform. Today, for example, there is fear of jobless growth due to digitalisation. True, some jobs will disappear. However, history teaches us that new jobs will also be created. The welfare state can buttress smooth life-course transitions by equipping people with the skills, knowledge and opportunities to adapt and to remain, while relying on the safety net in times of need. The welfare state is all about secure capacitation, about enabling people to participate in the economy and society without ever falling in between the breaks.

“If you want to save pensions, invest in children” Do you have a favourite welfare state? It’s a cliché, but that would be the Scandinavian welfare states. They provide the best balance of ‘stock, flow and buffers’ over the entire life-course in an inclusive manner. Germany is also interesting. Inequality is higher there than in Sweden or Denmark, but over the past ten years there has been a revolution in family policies. Day care and parental leave arrangements have expanded massively, and it has become very normal to see German fathers behind strollers in the park. The reason is simple, Germany is ageing and the economy needs more men and women at work. I always say: if you want to save pensions, invest in children.

How about the welfare state in Eastern Europe? Pensions, day care and working mothers were common in the Soviet days, as were free healthcare and education. These legacies have made the transition in welfare provision less complicated than in many other areas of society. However, the level and comprehensiveness of the welfare state is lower than in Western Europe. Yet, it proves difficult to modernise and expand the welfare state as this requires high social and institutional trust. In Eastern Europe, we see low levels of trust, especially vis-à-vis the state. An additional predicament, of course, is demography. In Romania and Bulgaria, many well-educated youngsters have migrated to Western Europe for job opportunities. What surprises me most is the new popularity for the 1990s breadwinner model ideal in countries like Poland and Hungary. It’s remarkable that gender emancipation under communism seems to have taken a backseat in the Visegrad countries.

You say that the welfare state should not be mistaken as simply a redistributive system of transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. Yet, most comprehensive welfare states are surely more equal in income. I argue against the neoliberal frame of the welfare state as inefficient redistribution. It is foremost an insurance policy for prosperity, serving to create and secure high levels of labour participation, productivity, and a sound fiscal basis for an inclusive society. True enough, the welfare state requires a progressive tax system. The broadest shoulders should bear the greatest burden. In Europe, there is strong consensus on this principle of support for the most vulnerable in society. When inequality is high, people demand a more progressive distribution of income and wealth, with the explicit aim to secure more equal opportunities. Where inequality is lower, as in the Nordic countries, people ask for higher rewards for personal economic initiative. There is a deep-rooted social-liberal compromise rooted in advanced EU democracies.

At what level of inequality? I struggle with that question. We all know that poverty is cumulative: low income, bad schooling, poor health, more exposure to unemployment, etc. Also at the top: wealth, income, education and employment cluster. At a certain point, it is no longer politically legitimate to have billionaires hoarding wealth in the Bahamas while the ten percent working poor struggle to make ends meet. As an economist by training, I always focus on employability and productivity. At the bottom, where needs and disadvantages are highest and deepest, the impact of the welfare investments are also the greatest. Ultimately, less inequality is good for jobs and growth.

You participate in a High-Level Expert Group advising the European Commission on the Future of Social Protection and the Welfare State. Could you provide a little glimpse of what’s in store? We are a group of a dozen professors in economics, political and the social sciences and law. We operate at a considerable distance from national politics and the delusions of the day. We compare the results and experiences of domestic developments in social security, labour markets, family services, pensions in the light of the megatrends such as digitalisation, decarbonisation and demographic ageing, with the intent to come up with policy recommendations on a novel social contract. We have just started, so I cannot say much, but secure capacitation, enabling people to contribute to the economy and society over the entire lifespan, is a central point of reference. I’ve been advocating social investment for over two decades, and it does seem that the question of ‘what kind of welfare state?’, instead of ‘how much welfare can we afford?’ is finally taken seriously. Not only because the European welfare state turned out to be a ‘winner’ over the Great Recession. Also, during the pandemic, the imperative of welfare buffers, next to lockdown restrictions, was evident as we needed to buy precious time to develop effective vaccines.

Pride may not be the first word that comes to everybody’s mind at the concept ‘welfare state’. The welfare state has been unjustly framed by neoliberal ideology in the 1980s: lazy people living off benefits, paid for by hardworking compatriots. Welfare reform was wrongly narrowed on the question of ‘how much welfare? The most comprehensive welfare states of the Nordic countries, but also Germany or the Netherlands, suffered relatively little in terms of economic output and jobs. The welfare state acted as a highly successful buffer, mitigated poverty at the bottom of society and stabilised the economy at the macro level. The title of my next book, written together with my Greek-Italian colleague Manos Matzagaras, is Who is Afraid of the Welfare State? In hindsight, there is no need whatsoever to the afraid. The relevant political question is no longer ‘how much welfare?’, but ‘what kind of welfare’?

The welfare state does not make people lazy? Most people want to work, they aspire to create things, contribute to and participate in society, raise a family, feel meaningful. However, I’m not a social psychologist; I’m a political economist studying cross-national differences in social policy reform and their results. In all my studies, I hardly ever came across evidence of a trade-off between economic growth or efficiency on the one hand and the welfare state on the other. I find the opposite correlation: when governments provide good education, affordable child-care and parental leave, inclusive social security, lifelong learning and active ageing, these results in high labour participation and high productivity rates. In the US - a fragmented welfare state - levels of labour participation and productivity rates are far lower. Many women stay at home while men work three different jobs to make family ends meet. Yet, hardly ever is social policy framed in terms of general economic policy serving to expand and stabilise the economic pie. It’s not a zero-sum game.

What is the essence of the welfare state? In my own jargon, I argue that welfare provision is about ‘stocks’, ‘flows’ and ‘buffers’. In Europe’s ageing societies and knowledgeable economies, you need well educated, productive, flexible and healthy workers: human capital stock. That requires good and affordable education and healthcare. Social security and retraining programmes help people in periods of risky transitions between jobs. Maternity and care leave, childcare and child benefit make it possible for people to combine family and work. Buffers and flow. The modern welfare state is thus foremost a collective insurance instrument against changing markets and economic tides. Today, for example, there is fear of jobless growth due to digitalisation. True, some jobs will disappear. However, history teaches us that new jobs will also be created. The welfare state can buttress smooth life-course transitions by equipping people with the skills, knowledge and opportunities to adapt and to remain, while relying on the safety net in times of need. The welfare state is all about secure capacitation, about enabling people to participate in the economy and society without ever falling in between the breaks.

The welfare state is the best insurance for prosperity. The welfare state is not an extravagance”, argues Anton Hemerijck. Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. “That is a popular frame, but a false necessity. I would say that the welfare state is the European University Institute, the best insurance for the most comprehensive welfare states in the world. US welfare state was retrenched. Europe stands proud to harbour passive safety net to an activating policy instrument. Meanwhile the welfare state was criticised and became subject to structural reform. Today, for example, there is fear of jobless growth due to digitalisation. True, some jobs will disappear. However, history teaches us that new jobs will also be created. The welfare state can buttress smooth life-course transitions by equipping people with the skills, knowledge and opportunities to adapt and to remain, while relying on the safety net in times of need. The welfare state is all about secure capacitation, about enabling people to participate in the economy and society without ever falling in between the breaks.

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Migration
Most splitting issue

It is without doubt the most splitting issue in Europe today: migration. Anti-migrant rhetoric was a major factor behind Britain leaving the European Union. Fears of job loss, crime and decline of national culture divide East and West, cosmopolitans and nationalists, city and countryside, people within communities and even families. Europe welcomed more than a million Syrian war refugees. It grants asylum to tens of thousands of refugees every year and allows even more foreign labourers to come and work. Yet, the continent has also been fenced and surrounded by razor wire in the past two decades. Circumstances in overcrowded refugee camps in Greece are dehumanising, humiliating and dangerous, and each year thousands drown crossing the Mediterranean on their quest for European freedom, safety or prosperity. In dealing with migration, Europe struggles with issues like human rights, welfare and safety.

82 MILLION MIGRANTS
Europe hosts just over eighty million migrants, eleven percent of the total population of nearly 750 million. A little over half were born within Europe. The number of non-European migrants increased from little over 35 million in 2015 to around 38 million in 2019.

While the high-income countries in Western Europe are immigrant countries, Eastern Europe saw many inhabitants leave over the past decades, especially young people. Almost one third of all Albanians and one fifth of all Latvians live elsewhere today. One million Bulgarians, two million Poles and three million Romanians have emigrated. Yet, Russia has the largest population of citizens living elsewhere in Europe: ten million. Switzerland (29.9 percent), Sweden (20 percent), Austria (20 percent) and Belgium (17 percent) are the countries with the highest share of migrants in Europe. Germany hosts the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is followed by France and Sweden. European immigration numbers are comparable to for example North America. Worldwide, 3.5 percent of the population is an international migrant, one in every thirty persons. In 1970, this number was 2.3 percent. In our ‘globalised world’ more than 96 percent of all people live in their country of birth.

Number of immigrants
The percentage of immigrants according to UN estimates
Source: UN Department of economic and social affairs, Population division, 2019.
Welcome or not

Acceptance

The acceptance or ‘hospitality’ towards immigrants on a scale of 0-10. The acceptance is measured by considering opinions on fear of job loss, criminality and strain on the national welfare system.

- No objections at all towards immigration
- Immigrants are not welcome at all

... by share of migrants

The percentage of people who think that immigration has a positive impact on their country. Countries are ordered by increasing numbers of migrants: in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA) around one percent of the inhabitants has a migrant background, in Switzerland (CH) nearly thirty percent. Countries with more migrants tend to judge the impact of migration more positively.

... since 2008

The rise or fall in migrant acceptance rates since 2008. A positive score indicates increased acceptance since 2008.
The acceptance of migration in Spain, France and Hungary according to the size of hometown. Inhabitants of large cities tend to welcome migrants more.

- by age

The gap in acceptance of migration between the youngest (Generation Z) and oldest generation (Silent generation). The youngest Spaniards judge migration considerably more positively than the oldest ones; in Poland, youths are more critical about migration than the elderly.

- by generation

The acceptance of migration according to the various generations in four European countries.

- in city and village

The acceptance of migration in Spain, France and Hungary according to the size of hometown. Inhabitants of large cities tend to welcome migrants more.

The most welcoming European

- Younger
- Woman
- High education
- Living in the city
- Higher income
- Single
- From Albania or Iceland
Migrants are newcomers and as such not part of the ingroup, but an "outgroup". The threat is not necessarily current or real; the theory is based on perceived threat.

The second social theory, contact hypothesis, states that personal, intergroup contact can change the perspective of original residents on newcomers as the outgroup. This happens for example when migrants prove to be good neighbours, skilful colleagues or reliable friends. Through personal experiences, the migrants become part of the community. The contact hypothesis was first put forward in the 1950s by the American psychologist Gordon Allport.

Both ethnic competition theory and contact hypothesis may apply at the same time as they work on different levels. According to the competition theory, a rising number of migrants will increase the perceived threat, but the contact hypothesis, conversely, claims that hostility will reduce as the likelihood of contacts between groups increases.

When economic conditions in a country are harsh, or when the cultural or ethnic differences between groups are larger, the competition theory predicts lower acceptance of migration. The same holds true for groups within society that are socio-economically more vulnerable as they tend to hold less favourable attitudes towards newcomers. Welfare, on the other hand, will lead to larger hospitality, not only by reducing economic threats but also by a lesser focus on materialistic issues and higher interests in the world and other cultures.

**THREAT OR ENRICHMENT**

Why does immigration instil fear of crime and job loss in some while it is welcomed for economic or humanitarian reasons by others? Why is multiculturalism seen as an asset to society by some and as a clear threat to national traditions, habits, and values by many others? In the social sciences, two theories try to explain these differences in views on immigration.

The ethnic competition theory explains hostility towards migrants as a group process. Groups are thought to compete for ‘scarce goods’. These goods can be economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but also economic benefits such as jobs, houses, medical care or social security, but 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Brexit and migration

The acceptance or ‘hospitality’ towards migrants on a scale of 0-10, before and after the Brexit referendum of 2016.

Brexit shock

In 2016, citizens in the United Kingdom could vote to leave the European Union, or to remain a member. The result of this referendum, a small majority (51.89%) for ‘leave’, sent shock waves and disbelief throughout Europe, and resulted in the first ever withdrawal of a country from the Union in 2020. The UK left after 47 years of membership to great regret of Scotland and parts of Wales and Northern Ireland where ‘remainers’ had the majority.

Brexit has been widely discussed and analysed by British social scientists such as Sara Hobolt, Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin and Maria Sobolewska. Their studies indicate that the British leave voters were motivated by anti-migration and anti-establishment feelings. There is a clear divide between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalisation and migration (often the less educated and the less well-off) and those who welcome such developments (in particular young graduates in the urban centres). Remain voters embrace the growing openness and opportunities for mobility and are keen to accelerate it whereas leave voters are more attached to traditional social identities and more anxious about rapid social change.

“However” stress Ford and Sobolewska in their book Brexitland, “these differences in outlook are differences in degree, not kind.” All groups in British society have shifted in a liberal, inclusive direction. The current generation is far more likely to be at ease with diversity than their parents or grandparents were. “Just a generation ago, large numbers of people were openly prejudiced against black people or people of Asian origin and quite happy to say so. Condemnation of racism today is near universal.” The heated debates before and after the Brexit referendum seem to have caused an acceleration in this shift. The European Values Study notices a clear ‘jump’ in acceptance of migrants between 2008 and 2017 in the UK, the largest in the whole of Europe.

Impact according to the British

Opinions on the impact of migration on the development of Great Britain by region.

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Immigration continent - since the 1950s

Europe’s current immigration era started in the 1950s. The century before, from 1846 to 1940, some 55 million Europeans left the continent. They packed their bags to emigrate to the ‘new world’. Entire regions were emptied out by the so-called ‘America fever’. From the Austrian empire alone, four to five million people left, 7 to 8 percent of the total population in those days. In addition, more than two million Irish emigrated, one quarter of the population. A major driver was the Great Irish Famine (1846-1847).

After World War II, economic progress in Europe, decolonisation and international conflicts reversed the migration flow. The great majority had never been to Europe, and many expected to return in time.

Labour

After World War II, economies in Northern Europe were booming. Because vacancies in factories and mines could not be filled by local people, governments started to recruit workers from abroad. They set up recruitment agencies in Southern Europe, in Greece, Italy and Portugal, but also in Turkey and North-Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Migration was generally viewed positively because of the economic benefits. Between 1950-1970, around 7-10 million people left Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal to work in the ‘North’.

After the oil crises in the 1970s, economic growth slowed down and migration stops were invoked. A lot of southern Europeans returned, but most workers from Turkey and North-Africa often chose to stay and brought their families over. Immigration became more and more regulated and an important topic in political and public debates. Rising unemployment levels fuelled anti-migrant rhetoric, for example by Front National (currently: Rassemblement National) in France and Vlaams Blok (currently: Vlaams Belang) in Belgium.

After the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989, new worker flows in Europe emerged, now from East to West. Poles, Romanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians filled vacancies in construction, horticulture and health care. An increasing number of migrants are skilled labourers from plumbers and carpenters to engineers and ICT experts. Especially India and China are recent ‘suppliers’ of educated ‘global’ workers.

Decolonisation

A wave of migrants from further than the European ‘periphery’ arrived after the worldwide wave of decolonisation following the end of World War II. Along with millions of returning European colonists, people of mixed descent and various colonial minority groups arrived. They often needed protection from the former coloniser because of the political situation. Their new home countries were not always well-prepared for their arrival. The largest groups came from French North-Africa and Indochina (1.8 million), Portuguese Africa (about 1 million) and the Dutch East Indies (300,000). Smaller numbers arrived from the former British and Belgian colonies in Africa and Asia. The great majority had never been to Europe, and many expected to return in time.

Asylum

After the genocide in 1915-1917, a group of 30,000 Armenians sought refuge in France. They were the first group to apply for asylum in Europe. Before then, asylum was something for the political elite. After World War II, the right to seek asylum in Europe became guaranteed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. In the 1960s, a first larger group to apply for asylum came from the Middle East: Iranians who opposed the regime of the Shah. From Eastern Europe, thousands succeeded in escaping the communist regimes. Latin America also produced sizeable numbers of refugees after the military putch in 1973.

From the 1990s onwards, the number of asylum seekers in Europe increased steadily. Fleeing from war or threats by various regimes; many Afghans, Tamils, Somalis, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Iraqis arrived. The opening of Eastern European borders made their journey to Europe easier. In addition, the Balkan wars, the first armed conflict on the European soil since WWII, caused millions to flee.

The largest inflow of asylum seekers in recent years was during 2015, instigated by the war in Syria. Nearly seven million Syrians, a third of the original population, fled their country since the war started in 2011. In 2015, a million travelled to Europe, mainly by crossing the Mediterranean in unseated boats. Especially Germany and Sweden welcomed many of the Syrian refugees with in their ‘slip stream’. When the flow of asylum seekers continued, the European Union closed borders and concluded agreements with Turkey and countries in Northern Africa to restrict migration.
“Today’s Islam impedes integration”

Religion does play a role in integration of migrants in Europe, says Ruud Koopmans. An Islamic background reduces social and economic status and perspectives. “We find the effect everywhere, also when Muslim fundamentalist migrants are compared to other fundamentalist religious migrants.”

Migration seems a divisive issue between Eastern and Western Europe, do you agree? Western Europe has a long history with migration and also has positive experiences. For Eastern Europe, immigration is new and we, social scientists, know that fears are highest in this initial stage. A feeling of control is crucial. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Wir schaffen das and European pressure to accept refugee quota resulted in fear of losing national identity in Eastern Europe. An identity that for most is far from self-evident. Poles and Romanians remember the times when they were not allowed to have or express a national identity very vividly, they consider it fragile. Leaders in West Europe were fast in their accusations of rabid nationalism or right wing populism; they could show more understanding for objections towards migration in Eastern Europe.

But… human rights, high on Europe’s priority list, are in jeopardy. Thousands of refugees die at sea each year and hundreds of thousands suffer in horrible refugee camps. Europe’s migration policy is a catastrophe both from a human rights and an efficiency perspective. The refugee deal with Turkey makes Erdogan, a dictator, the doorman of Europe. A solution will only come when both sides agree to compromises. ‘Left’ politicians declare the individual right to asylum inimical, but 95 percent of everyone who sets foot in Europe stays because it’s in practice impossible to send people back with no right to asylum. That has resulted in a cruel smuggler industry. Politicians on the right have one solution: closing borders. They should show compassion by allowing a particular number of refugees in every year; people who have applied for asylum in countries bordering a conflict zone - a system like Canada and the US. That is much more humane as it ensures shelter for the most vulnerable and persecuted people, not for whoever can pay smugglers or for the young, healthy men that are most likely to survive a dangerous journey.

Is your message heard? The public discussion about migration does not stand out in providing facts. I’m often accused of Islamophobia when I point out that migrants with roots in Islamic countries are overrepresented in statistics on violence against women, homosexuals or Jews, or when I write that today these minorities suffer most in Islamic countries. Europe is also often accused of being Islamophobic, often by the same Islamic countries that refuse to support the West in protesting against China’s harsh and cruel suppression of millions of co-religionists, the Uighurs. I want to contribute rationality to the discussion, that’s why I published not only scientific papers on the topic but also a book for the general audience*. Yet my influence is limited, I’m an outsider. Real change needs to come from within the Islamic world, from more liberal Muslims. That’s difficult. Fundamentalist organisations are well-organised and well-funded, and countries such as Turkey hold a strong grip on migrant communities in Europe. When a Muslim speaks out like I do, the reactions are often enraged.

Most Europeans are in favour of migrants keeping their own habits and traditions. You’re right? I’m all in favour when it comes to food or music. I wouldn’t want to go back to our homogeneous culture of the 1950s. However, when it comes to views on homosexuality, apostacy, or gender roles, traditions of migrants are often problematic. In between, there are many shades of grey. Take for instance language. A bilingual education is a benefit, but only when a child is well submerged in both languages at a young age and has the necessary cognitive capabilities. Me and my Turkish wife are raising our daughter with both languages at a young age and has the necessary cognitive capabilities. I’m not worried at all about a detrimental effect. However, when migrant children haven’t heard the language of their home country before entering primary school, they may not catch up anymore, causing a lifelong disadvantage. I think priority should always be given to the language of the country one grows up in.

But… how does religion impede integration of migrants? Islamic families are larger. Therefore, time, attention and money needs to be divided over more children. Studies in for example Germany and Denmark clearly show that this results in lower educational levels. A second way by which Islam hampers integration is by the lower labour participation of women. That is an important cause of the economic backlog of the Islamic world, but also of the lower economic welfare of Muslim migrant families in Europe. Another important negative influence is segregation. Islamic migrants have a strong orientation towards their own group because of religious taboos such as separation of men and women. Children of Islamic migrants play little with children with a different background, and marriages of Muslims with non-Muslims are rare. This results in language delays and in a limited societal network, two important factors for career development. All factors add up to a significant negative effect caused by religion.

But… discrimination does exist Yes, it does and it disadvantages migrants. Yet when one compares groups of migrants, for example migrants from India or Pakistan living in the UK, it turns out that non-Islamic migrants thrive better than the Muslim migrants. Religion has an effect, independent of discrimination.

But… Islam can’t be a worse religion, can it? Who reads the holy books, the Bible, the Quran or the Torah, can find legitimacy in them all, for all the good and for all the bad in people. I don’t consider Islam better or worse than any other religion, but the Islamic world has come under the spell of a fundamentalist explanation of the Koran, especially since the year 1979. The Islamic world chose a path away from democracy, innovation, human rights and consequently economic growth. Islamic people worldwide have on average two years less education, and in the rich countries the difference is almost three years. The support under Muslims for religious violence is nearly 35 percent, five times larger than in all other religious groups.

But… where does religion harm integration of migrants? Islamic families are larger. Therefore, time, attention and money needs to be divided over more children. Studies in for example Germany and Denmark clearly show that this results in lower educational levels. A second way by which Islam hampers integration is by the lower labour participation of women. That is an important cause of the economic backlog of the Islamic world, but also of the lower economic welfare of Muslim migrant families in Europe. Another important negative influence is segregation. Islamic migrants have a strong orientation towards their own group because of religious taboos such as separation of men and women. Children of Islamic migrants play little with children with a different background, and marriages of Muslims with non-Muslims are rare. This results in language delays and in a limited societal network, two important factors for career development. All factors add up to a significant negative effect caused by religion.

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*) Het vervallen huis van de Islam/Das verfallene Haus des Islam, translated into Danish and Norwegian.
(N)ever a ‘real’ citizen

A true compatriot

The most important aspect for being a truly fellow countryman or woman.

- Being born in the country
- Having ancestors from the country
- Respecting the country’s political institutions and laws
- Speaking the national language(s)
- Sharing the national culture

The importance of five aspects in being a fellow countryman or woman.

The rise or fall (in percentage points) in the importance of ancestry for being ‘a real fellow countryman’ since 2008.
BECOMING IN-CROWD

Immigration reduction is a key priority of many European populists such as Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Marine le Pen (France), Nigel Farage (UK), or Geert Wilders (The Netherlands). Populist campaigns are marked by a hostile anti-migrant rhetoric, often exaggerating migration numbers and warnings about job loss, cultural disintegration and staggering crime numbers.

National identity plays a key role in populist leaders’ views and speeches. They claim to fight for the hardworking, honest, proud, patriotic citizens and their traditional values. Newcomers are thought to disrupt national solidarity, unity, habits and virtues.

According to the social identity theory, first formulated by the Polish-born British social psychologist Henri Tajfel, populists regard the original inhabitants of a country as the in-group. They are the real, rightful citizens, as opposed to the outgroup of newcomers with other, strange ideas and habits. ‘Us against ‘them’, familiarity and unity against change and diversity.

The European Values Study investigates what ‘criteria’ people use to ‘classify’ migrants as in-or outgroup, as ‘true’ fellow countrymen and –women or as foreign ‘intruders’. Criteria such as complying with the national laws or speaking the national language reflect conditions that can in principle be met by people of all origins. Yet, people may also use criteria such as descent, ethnic group or religion that will almost automatically place all migrants in the outgroup.

Integrate or assimilate

Should migrants keep their own customs and traditions (integrate) or should they fully adopt their new home country’s culture (assimilate). The percentage of people who think it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct culture and traditions (integrate).

... through the years

The changing opinion on whether migrants should maintain their customs and traditions or should adopt the culture of their new home country. Shown is the support for integration, maintaining customs and traditions. There is no clear trend.
Tolerance and respect in upbringing

The percentage of people who consider ‘tolerance and respect for other people’ one of the most important qualities to teach children.

- 30 - 39 %
- 40 - 49 %
- 50 - 59 %
- 60 - 69 %
- 70 - 79 %
- 80 - 89 %
- 90 - 100 %

... through the years

Changes in the importance of teaching children ‘tolerance and respect for other people’ for some countries in Western and Eastern Europe.
Working hard(er)

Stealing ‘our’ jobs

Agreement with the statement ‘immigrants take jobs away from people born and raised in this country’.

... through the years

The rise or fall in support of the statement ‘immigrants take jobs away from people born and raised in this country’ since 2008. Changes are expressed in percentage points.

Stealing ‘our’ jobs... by education

By level of education in Russia, Slovenia and Sweden.

Stealing ‘our’ jobs... by generation

According to generation in Russia, Slovenia and Sweden.

Stealing ‘our’ jobs... in village and city

In villages and cities in Russia, Slovenia and Sweden.

The acceptance with the statement ‘Immigrants take jobs away from people born and raised in this country’ in Russia, Slovenia and Sweden.
Prioritize ‘our’ people

When jobs are scarce, should employers give priority to people born and raised in the country over immigrants? Shown is the support for prioritising ‘our own people’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19 %</td>
<td>10 - 19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29 %</td>
<td>20 - 29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39 %</td>
<td>30 - 39 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 - 45 %</td>
<td>40 - 45 %</td>
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<td>70 - 79 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>80 - 89 %</td>
<td>80 - 89 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>90 - 100 %</td>
<td>90 - 100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A dividing issue

Differences of opinion about the statement ‘When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people born and raised in the country over immigrants in five countries’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower level of education</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level of education</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher level of education</td>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Worries about the welfare state

The percentage of people who agree that migration causes strain on the country’s welfare system. Countries are ordered by increasing social expenditure; Lithuania spends 14 percent and France 31 percent of its GDP on social purposes (according to the OECD’s Social Expenditure Database, SOCX, 2017).
Diligence

The level of work ethos, based on the appreciation of hard work, and considering work a duty and positive contribution to society. Scale: 1-5, with high scores referring to a high work ethos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.0 - 3.4</td>
<td>Moderate work ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 - 3.9</td>
<td>High work ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0 - 5.0</td>
<td>Very high work ethos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CRIME AND TERRORISM

According to the European Values Study, the greatest fear in Europe in 2008 associated with immigration was crime. In 2017, the greatest concern had clearly shifted to ‘strain on the welfare system’. A probable cause is the different economic situation. In 2008, Europe had seen many successive years of economic growth. That changed in 2009 when Eurozone member Greece - and also later some other Southern European countries - faced severe financial problems because of large national debts. The problems were solved in the end, but only after fierce negotiations between the northern and southern countries within the Eurozone. Economic confidence was damaged and together with the worldwide late 2008 recession, are likely to have increased worries about welfare.

At the same time, crime rates have been dropping slowly but steadily in Europe. European migrant crime numbers follow this trend. Migrants, and more specifically second-generation migrants, tend to be overrepresented in crime statistics, which are typically dominated by lower educated men of low financial-economic status. Because language problems and (indirect) discrimination reduce opportunities on the labour market and many migrants hold unskilled jobs, this overrepresentation may be called a ‘logical’ consequence. Yet, cultural differences and values have also been put forward as a cause, in particular in (sexual) harassment cases and crimes against women.

Fear of terrorism, more specifically of fundamental Islamic terrorism, may contribute to concerns about crime committed by migrants. Both before 2008 (e.g. Madrid 2004, London 2005) and 2017 (Paris 2015, Nice 2016, Brussels 2016) severe (suicide) attacks took place by radicalised migrants and/or refugees. The offenders were inspired by the Muslim fundamentalism of Al Qaeda or Islamic State.

However, European countries score low on the Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace. Turkey is listed highest at position 18 (of over 140 countries) with the impact of terrorism classified as ‘high’. The next European country on the list is the United Kingdom (50th, just after the United States) for which the impact is considered ‘medium’. Four other European countries are in the same category: Ukraine, France, Russia and Greece. All other European countries score lower on this world index.

DILIGENT WORKERS

The birth rate in the European Union has dropped from 2.5 births per woman in the 1950s to 1.5 in the 2010s. The highest birth rate in 2018 is reported in France (1.9), the lowest in Spain and Italy (1.3). Since the mid-1990s, fewer children are born than people are dying. Consequently, the European population will decline in the long run. EU’s population is projected to peak at 515 million in 2044, and will progressively decline to 468 million in 2100.

An ageing population is, in principle, a happy story about medical and societal progress. At the same time, it is a challenge for society’s structure and economy as the projections foresee a decline in the share of working-age people from 65 percent in 2018 to 55 percent in 2100. Possible solutions for the decrease in ‘working hands’ may be found in IT and robotics, an increased birth rate or immigration. High-income countries already compete for young, well-educated workers and there is a large stream of young workers from Eastern to Western European countries.

As a result, Eastern European countries are confronted with even faster ageing societies. More immigration, however, does not seem an option. Eastern European countries are the most opposed to immigration. Prime minister Viktor Orbán of Hungary has started to offer university scholarships only to those who promise to stay in Hungary, gave citizen­ship to ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders and every Hungarian woman with four or more children will receive a lifetime exemption from paying income tax. “We need Hungarian children, not immigration”, Orbán declared.
In Poland and Finland the trends are clearly in opposite directions.

In some typical emigration and immigration countries by generation.

- Silent Generation
- Baby boomers
- Generation X
- Millennials
- Generation Z

The rise or fall in the objection to living next door to ‘people with a different ethnic background’ is shown: the rise or fall in the objection to living next door to migrants as their neighbours.

The percentage of people who don’t like migrants as their neighbours.

Objection to migrants as neighbours

The rise or fall (in percentage points) since 1990 of people who do not like migrants as their neighbours.

BLACK LIVES MATTER IN EUROPE, TOO

In May 2020, George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, was asphyxiated when three officers held him down in Minneapolis, USA. An officer placed his knee on Floyd’s neck for almost nine minutes despite his repeated pleas that he could not breathe. Large protests ensued against police violence and profiling of Black people. These Black Lives Matter (BLM) demonstrations evoked protests in many European cities, too. People marched in support of BLM in the US, but also against racism and police brutality in Europe. Thousands protested in Paris, London, Madrid, Amsterdam, Zurich, Helsinki, Stockholm, Berlin, Milan, Krakow and many other cities. In France, the protests were the largest, happening in cities like Marseille, Bordeaux, Lille, Nantes and Metz. People often chanted the name of Adama Traoré, a citizen of Malian descent who died in police custody in 2016. Protesters gathered despite the corona pandemic, wearing masks and keeping social distance.

In London and Paris, demonstrations led to clashes with far-rights groups who started protests against ‘anti-white racism’ and claimed to defend British or French culture as some historical monuments were damaged in BLM protests. For example, a statue of the 19th-century slave trader Edward Colston in the port city of Bristol was toppled. In Ghent, a statue of Leopold II, the Belgian king who pillaged and looted The Congo, was covered in a hood with the caption ‘I Can’t Breathe’ and splashed with red paint. In central London, protesters sprayed ‘was a racist’ on a statue of former British Prime minister Winston Churchill.

Gary Younge, a professor of sociology at Manchester University, explained the for some surprisingly large echo of the BLM protests in Europe in the Guardian. “Perhaps only because the continent is not blighted by the gun culture of the US, racism here is less lethal. But it is just as prevalent in other ways. Levels of incarceration, unemployment, deprivation and poverty are all higher for black Europeans. ‘Racism is worse in America than here’, people insist. Racism’s bad everywhere, has always been my retort. There really is no ‘better kind.’”
FORTRESS EUROPE

Today, Europe has been described as ‘Fortress Europe’. National immigration and asylum laws have become very strict over the past decades and the ‘migrant or refugee crisis’ is on the top of the EU agenda. The Union has fortified its borders against illegal immigration from Asia and Africa. Many fences have been installed and a special agency guards the Mediterranean, sending refugee boats back to Turkey and Northern Africa. In attempts to reach the continent, many drown in the Mediterranean, get lost crossing the Sahara or are murdered by human traffickers. There is no official record of the number of refugees who go missing trying to reach Europe, but NGOs report more than 42,000 deaths since 1995. The UNHCR estimated that 2.275 million people perished in the Mediterranean in 2018 – an average of six deaths every day. Since 2016, refugees arriving in Southern Europe are halted and sent to refugee camps. In late 2019, Greek refugee camps hosted over 185,000 refugees and asylum seeker, including over 5,000 unaccompanied children, mostly from Afghanistan, Syria, Congo and Iran. Their asylum requests are investigated and when asylum is granted, people are to be allocated to various EU member countries. However, little progress is being made with the procedures and Eastern European countries refuse to cooperate, leaving thousands of migrants living in overcrowded camps and under unsafe conditions for years now. The camps have been called ‘Europe’s shame’, and authorities have been accused of not changing the situation to scare off migrants from coming to Europe. In September 2020, the most notorious camp, Moria, on the Greek island Lesbos burnt down, leaving almost 15,000 refugees homeless again. It is unclear if the fire was caused by cooking stoves, was a protest action from refugees or far-right anti-migrant Greek, or a result of conflicts between refugee groups within the camp. NGO Médecins Sans Frontières commented that people “kept in inhumane conditions for years are a time bomb that finally exploded”. New camps have been opened, but living conditions are even worse, stated Oxfam, who noticed a lack of running water, toilets and lights.

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Juliana Santos Wallgren is senior advocacy officer on migration at ENAR, the European Network Against Racism. This NGO was founded in 1998 by grassroots activists on a mission to achieve legal change in Europe towards racial equality. Five questions about migration and discrimination.

EVS data indicate a slow but steady decline in discrimination in Europe, except for migrants. Do you recognise this trend? No, not really. Analysing trends in discrimination is always highly complicated. Are there really fewer incidents or do people report less? And when figures rise: what is the influence of growing awareness? With a question such as ‘would you want to live next door to ...’ EVS measures interpersonal discrimination, which may stabilise because of growing awareness. The results on migrants are troublesome, and also intriguing. Who is ‘the migrant’? People may think of Muslims, of asylum seekers, Eastern European workers, Black people or other groups. The increase may reflect all kinds of fears and phobias.

Is discrimination of migrants worse in particular parts of Europe? Again a difficult question. There are large differences in how discrimination manifests itself. A country like Germany offers a good welcome package, but after that first phase particular groups are confronted with structural exclusion on the labour market. France and the UK are worst when it comes to Islamophobia. Spain, Hungary and Croatia are all notorious for police violence, and a country like Belgium has a bad reputation for unlawfully detaining migrants of colour. Everywhere in Europe, migrants are underprotected and overpoliced due to structural and systemic discrimination.

Any good news on discrimination? Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of George Floyd have raised the awareness of systemic discrimination and white privilege. The year 2020 has been pivotal. White people understand that they need to listen; they started reading literature and books and come to trainings on the topic. However, that is often only effective on a personal, not on the institutional level. It took us more than twenty years to convince the EU to draw an action plan against racism, and this is only just a plan. Yet, the seed has been planted, that’s hopeful.

Do you consider discrimination a decisive factor in the weaker socio-economic position of people with a migrant background throughout Europe? Without any doubt. Migrants are only welcome when labour is scarce, the system is built on and for exploitation. Our statistics show that female Muslim migrants are especially vulnerable. They are confronted with discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, race and class. Did you know that nearly one hundred percent of all cases of slapping-out-of-nothing, a hate crime occurring daily in our streets, is directed against female Muslims wearing a head scarf? The rate of Islamophobia is really concerning.

A lot of work to do for ENAR... For all of us. Europe has only just started its decolonisation process. Institutional discrimination is a huge problem, embedded in society and hard to combat. Work permits, for example, are only within reach for people from developed countries. That is a clear modern form of systemic racism and exclusion. Personal awareness is rising, but educating people takes a heavy toll on the teachers. They receive harmfu comments, are criticised and bullied, and there are always threats by far-right supporters. The level of burn-out is high. Raising your voice, and standing in the spotlights is important and necessary. We do it, but it comes with risks. Only recently, Cyprus shut down human rights groups like KISA that provided free legal support for migrants, and also France criminalises NGOs that support refugees.

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Sustainability
Climate change

Climate change is a "defining issue of our time" according to the United Nations. Rising CO₂ levels will lead to droughts and floods, and unliveable temperatures in some densely populated regions. Crop failure, hunger, heat waves and water shortage and poverty may result in large numbers of climate refugees and "water wars" between countries. Most sociological studies into environmentalism conclude that Europeans are aware of the future problems, care about environmental quality, and are concerned for themselves and others. For example, the 2017 Eurobarometer Report shows that more than nine in ten respondents say that the protection of the environment is important to them personally.

LUXURY OR HEALTH THREAT

The social sciences offer two explanations for differences in environmental concern between countries, over time and across different groups in society. The first focuses on wealth and post-materialism, and was introduced by the American political scientist Ronald Inglehart. He argues that as more and more people grow up in economically stable and secure societies, their basic needs are fulfilled and they will strive for higher-order non-economic goals such as self-expression, autonomy, and quality of life (see also Chapter 2). Concern for nature conservation and biodiversity fall into these ‘higher needs’, and can thus be regarded as a kind of luxury good.

The second explanation for environmentalism is individual and direct experience with pollution or nature degradation, for example through strong, dead rivers or forest clearing. Concerns about health problems and loss of nature will trigger environmentalism. Until now, climate change has not been viewed as a direct experience leading to environmentalism because floods and droughts are still mostly future threats in Europe. Yet, climate change starts to manifest itself by a series of hot summers and shortening of the ski season. Both perspectives can explain differences in environmental concern at the country level as well as the individual level, and are related in a complex way. Above a certain level, economic development may foster environmental protection due to innovation and more environmental awareness. This would imply a kind of paradox. Industrialisation and prosperity, initially large drivers of pollution and climate change, will lead to more environmental awareness and stimulate the protection of nature and resources through innovations. American economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger proposed an inverted U-shaped relation between economic growth and the environment, named the environmental Kuznets curve.

Right from its publication in 1995, the curve has been criticised. It might be a good representation in the case of pollutants for which developed countries over time initiated a worldwide ban, but in the important case of CO₂-emissions, the actual relation between emission and wealth still shows a straight upwards line. According to environmental economist Alan Stern, only in very high-income countries with slow economic growth, pollution reduction efforts can overcome the growth effect, taking into account all pollution, as wealthy countries tend to "export" pollution by "outsourcing" manufacturing processes to lower-income countries. Whereas a recent movement called ‘ecomodernism’ sees economic development as the way to resolve environmental problems, a majority of the green activist movement sees less consumption as inevitable to solve the ecological crisis.

Three opposing views are personalised in the book The Wizard and the Prophet (2018) by the American novelist Charles C. Mann. In this book the ‘wizard’ is Norman Borlaug, the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1970 credited for enabling the Green Revolution by introducing modern agricultural production techniques and saving one billion people from starvation. William Vogt, an early proponent of population control is the ‘prophet’, dedicating a life to warnings that earth’s resources are limited and need to be better protected. Mann himself feels that the ‘prophets’ form a majority in western culture, yet the wizards dominate in its politics.

The British sociologists Riley Dunlap and Robert Emmett Jones defined three levels of environmental consciousness at the start of this century. First, people become aware of environmental problems (‘environmentalism’). Once ‘awake’, people start supporting efforts to solve the problem: they are willing to pay for environmental protection and back climate policy measures such as subsidy for renewable energy or housing insulation. Finally, people will start acting sustainably themselves. They will recycle, buy an electric car, reduce flights and meat consumption or turn their garden into a ‘tiny forest’ to reduce climate change. In sociological terms, the three phases are labelled cognitive, affective and behavioural expression of environmental concern.
... by gender

The ‘gender gap’ in environmental consciousness in percentage points. In Norway and Sweden the environmental awareness among women is almost twenty percent higher than among men. Only in Portugal women are significantly less environmental conscious than men.

... by education

Higher-educated people are more concerned about the environment in all European countries. Shown is the ‘gap’ in environmental consciousness between high and low educated individuals, in percentage points.

... by political preference

Environmental consciousness according to political preferences in three countries: Sweden, The Netherlands and Czech Republic.

Biggest concern

The ‘single most serious problem facing the world’.

Source: Eurobarometer (2019)
Environment over economy

Does a majority or minority prioritise environment over economy? The size of the majority in percentage points. Negative percentages thus indicate a minority.

The percentage of people who prioritise environment over economic growth

Environmental consciousness and welfare

The percentage of environmentally conscious people versus welfare per country (GDP per capita, in international Dollars). Environmentalism correlates well with GDP per capita.

Environmental scepticism

The percentage of people who think that the claims of environmental threats are exaggerated.

- 10 - 19 %
- 20 - 29 %
- 30 - 39 %
- 40 - 49 %
> 50 %

Environment, economy and belief

The support for prioritising environment over economic growth for non-religious and religious people in three rather secular and three highly religious countries.

Environmentalism and religion

The gap in environmentalism between non-religious and religious people. In Poland and Portugal non-religious people are more than 15 percentage points more likely to be environmentally conscious than their religious fellow countrymen. In Slovakia and Romania, religious people show more environmentalism.

In 2015, Pope Francis gave an official view on the climate crisis in a special encyclical letter Laudato Si, in which he calls upon mankind to care for “Sister Earth”: Humancy should “till and keep the garden of the world” as is written in Genesis, too. “Each creature has its own purpose. None is superfluous”, writes Francis. He also calls for urgent measures against climate change and pollution, and talks of an ecological crisis. Patriarch Bartholomew of the Eastern Orthodox Communion has also called for more environmental awareness.

Do Christians stand out on environmental concern? Perhaps surprisingly, the European Values Study shows the opposite, consistent with other sociological research into this topic. The EVS data indicate that being religious results in slightly less environmental awareness today and in a reduced willingness to contribute to sustainability and biodiversity. An explanation is that on average religious Europeans are more conservative than non-religious Europeans while sustainability fits into more progressive, post-materialist thinking. The notion that mankind masters the world thus still seems to ‘override’ the call for stewardship.

GOD’S CREATURES

Nature and natural phenomena - the moon, a tree or lightning - are often considered divine in nature religions. Also in ancient Greek culture, nature was worshipped and particular flora and fauna were considered sacred and left untouched. Christianity, dominant religion in contemporary Europe, has a more dualistic approach towards nature and its resources. In the book Genesis 1:28 God tells his people to “replenish the earth, and subdue it”, and to “have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth”. It’s a call for stewardship over every living creature, but at the same time puts mankind above all flora and fauna.

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Main objection against environmentalism

The most often mentioned objection to act environmentally friendly.

- **Green** - It’s just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment
- **Pink** - There are more important things to do in life than protect the environment
- **Yellow** - There is no point in doing what I can do for the environment unless others do the same
- **Purple** - Many of the claims about environmental threats are exaggerated

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**Sustainability gap in the Baltics**

The Baltic states are often mentioned in the same breath. Yet, in terms of sustainability values Estonia and Lithuania lie far apart. Estonian values and opinions often resemble those in Western and Northern countries, whereas Lithuania joins the Eastern European countries in a focus on economics and with a relatively high share of environmental sceptics. A few questions about this large difference between the two countries to EVS Programme Director Rūta Žiliukaitė (Lithuania).

**Are you surprised by the gap?**

No, outsiders often think that the Baltic states are socially and culturally alike. That is quite erroneous, there are large differences. Geographically, we are neighbours and once we were a part of the communist Soviet Union, but that doesn’t make us similar. Sustainability is just one of the many aspects in which the Baltic countries differ.

**Can you name a few important differences?**

Lithuania for example is predominantly Catholic, Estonia was historically Protestant but is now one of the most secular countries in Europe. The Latvian and Lithuanian languages are related and belong to the Baltic family, but Estonian is very different; it forms a language family with Finnish and Hungarian. Furthermore, Lithuania is one of the European countries with the highest income inequality, whereas in Estonia the gap is smaller. In Lithuania there is low trust in government, and low levels of political and social participation, more like Romania or Bulgaria. In this respect, Estonia is doing better.

**Where do the differences come from?**

Estonia has been under the influence of German and Finnish traditions. There is a strong northern swing in their history, whereas in Lithuania the influence of Poland was stronger. Estonia was already industrialised and urbanised before World War II, when Lithuania was predominantly an agrarian society. Later, under the occupation by the Soviet Union, Estonian elites were removed from power - administrators from Russia were appointed. In Lithuania, locals were integrated into communism.

**Do you see Lithuania approaching Estonia?**

For the Lithuanians, it is a bit frustrating that the country is always compared to Estonia, which is doing better in many aspects. One must remember that their starting position has always been different. Neither historically, nor culturally or economically, we were close to Estonia. At the start of the transition from communism, thirty percent of Lithuanians still worked in the agricultural sector. Lithuania also had one of the highest rates of emigration, which has resulted in an ageing population. As a social scientist, I would say our history has not been very favourable for developing solidarity, trust and social capital. A popular view is that we have bad politicians who always complain that they have a bad nation.

**Are youths more active in environmentalism?**

Yes, there have been protests from youngsters and school strikes. The reactions to these protests show the polarisation in the country, as the youngsters were immediately accused of not being concerned about the poverty of the old people in Lithuania.
Willingess to act

Renewable energy

The percentage of renewable electricity in each country produced by solar cells, wind- and watermills and other “green” sources.

Source: IRENA (2017)

- Iceland has 92 percent renewable electricity from hydropower and geothermal sources.

Environmental performance

Which countries perform best in addressing the environmental challenges that every nation faces? Yale University ranks 180 countries based on 32 indicators ranging from particulate matter, quality of drinking water, tree coverage, biodiversity and measures against climate change. Denmark leads the world ranking in 2020 with 83.5 points, Liberia is number 180 with a score of 22.6. Given are the European scores in 2020.

Source: epi.yale.edu

Making a difference yourself

Can you personally make a difference for the environment or is there no point in acting environmentally friendly unless others do the same? Opinions are divided in Europe. The chart shows a majority or minority (in percentage points) in the population answering this question positively. In Sweden and Albania a clear majority thinks individual action does make a difference, whereas in Azerbaijan and Serbia most people feel that individual efforts have no effect.
Paying for a cleaner environment

The percentage of people who is prepared to donate part of their income to prevent pollution (when it is guaranteed that the money will be spent on this cause).

... by political preference

The political 'gap' (in percentage points) in willingness to donate part of one's income to the environment. In Switzerland and Iceland 'left voters' are more eager to pay for a clean environment than 'right voters'; in Lithuania and Azerbaijan the opposite is true.

Free riders

In some European countries, the support for environmentalism is higher than the willingness to financially contribute to a healthier environment by donating a part of one's income. The 'gap' is widest in Finland and Slovakia.

Green volunteers

The percentage of people who belong to a voluntary organisation for nature conservation, animal rights or environmental health. Also given (for comparison): the percentage of people active for a humanitarian organisation or charity.
Youngest not always the greenest

Most environmentally conscious generation
Countries coloured according to the most environmentally conscious generation.

Generation Z
Millenials
Generation X
Baby boomers
Silent Generation

“WE DEMAND A SAFE FUTURE. IS THAT REALLY TOO MUCH TO ASK?”

In September 2019, around seven million people worldwide joined the Global Climate Strike. It took place during the UN Climate Action Summit in New York and was one of the largest, if not the largest global protest ever. Only the worldwide protest against the Iraq war in 2003 may compete in size.

Climate (school) strikes were initiated in the summer of 2018 by the then 15-year-old Swedish student Greta Thunberg. She was shocked by the lack of governmental actions to combat climate change and its devastating effects on earth in the coming century.

Pupils in many other countries in Europe, but also in Canada, Australia and India, followed her example, mostly on Fridays. Soon the climate strikes were better known as Fridays for Future and attracted not a few, but hundreds and even thousands of participants. The protests reached a high point at the Global Climate Strike with demonstrations in 180 countries. Initiator Greta Thunberg was one of the speakers in New York having travelled sustainably by crossing the Atlantic Ocean by boat. She is devoting her life to call upon world leaders to spring into action, and has become a perhaps surprising frontman of the climate movement. In late 2019, she was elected Person of the Year by Time Magazine, the youngest ever.

Environmentalism by generation
The percentage of people who are environmentally conscious in five countries by generation.

Generation Z
Millenials
Generation X
Baby boomers
Silent Generation
The contemporary environmental movement started in the late 19th century when fears grew for the loss of countryside in Europe and wilderness in the United States. In these early years, nature conservation was predominantly an aristocratic issue. In 1914, the Swiss government was the first to assign 14,000 hectares in the Swiss Alps as Europe’s first national park after a lobby by upper-class scientists and conservationists.

Later, health problems caused by industrial pollution became more prominent in environmental activism—centrally after the “great smog of London” in 1952 which is estimated to have caused 12,000 deaths. More and more measures were taken to regulate air quality, and the first sewage treatment plants were installed to improve surface water quality. During the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalism gained broader public support and environmental activism arose, resulting for example in furious protests against nuclear power. In these years, non-governmental organisations such as World Wide Fund for Nature and Greenpeace were founded, and several “green” political parties won seats in the national parliaments.

In 1968, a group of nearly forty concerned European scientists established the Club of Rome. Their first report The Limits of Growth (1972) predicted that further unlimited economic and population growth would inevitably lead to an ecological and human disaster. About 30 million copies were sold in over 30 languages, making it the most influential publication on environmentalism to date.

Since the millennium, environmental activism has become increasingly focused on climate change and loss of biodiversity; themes that are more global and abstract than river or air pollution. Especially future generations will be confronted with these problems. Young generations also seem to take a lead in climate protests, for example by organising school strikes.

In Europe, environmental legislation has made rivers and air cleaner over the past decades. The area of forests and nature reserves is expanding again, and extinct and endangered species like the wolf, lynx and otter have returned in many European countries. At the same time, intensive farming is creating large ‘biodiversity deserts’ on the continent, leading to loss of insect populations and countryside birds. And whereas Europe’s woods are expanding, soy cultivation as feed for European cattle causes the Amazon rainforests to shrink. Environmentalism is growing, but activists warn that it is already five past twelve when it comes to saving Mother Earth.
It has become a familiar picture: youngsters in the streets protesting against the lack of climate action by their governments. Every Friday, student Tobias Holle is also out on the streets. “We urgently need to convince people to change the economic system; we may have reached some tipping points already.”

Climate protests and strikes by young Europeans started in 2018 when Greta Thunberg, a then fourteen years old Swedish school girl refused to attend lessons on Fridays. She had a much more urgent cause in her life: combating climate change. She initiated a quickly spreading protest of youngsters all over the world, urging politicians and government to listen to climate scientists and to take immediate actions against climate change.

Tobias Holle is one of the many youngsters who joined Greta. He became active for Fridays for Future in early 2019, joining local and national street protest in Germany, advocating climate action on social media and actively contacting politicians. In busy times, he easily spends thirty hours a week on climate activism. “If we keep going on as usual, we have no control over what will happen to the world. Irreversible changes are near and we can’t really predict how large the catastrophe will be. We will see political instability, droughts, floods, and large flows of refugees, also in western countries. It will be big and influence all our lives in so many ways.”

Fridays for Future demand immediate action, why? We have only five, maybe ten years to act. Tipping points are near, in Siberia the permafrost is maybe past an irreversible point already. If we don’t act now, we will lose a lot of the progress we made over the past decades in human rights, poverty and health. I was active for Engineers without Borders before I joined Fridays for Future. That was without any question useful work: building infrastructure that really helps people. However, our help did not bring structural changes, I noticed. Clean water, schools and roads should be the primary concern of governments, but more often it is not. Fighting climate change asks for structural changes, changes that will also help fighting injustice in the world.

What kinds of changes do you mean? Solar energy, CO2-pricing? Those are just useful tools. It is not only about technology. We need structural economic and societal changes, alternatives to the current systems. We need to ask ourselves if it is right what we are doing in every part of our life. GDP must be just one of ten or maybe even twenty parameters that determine the way societies function, the way we live together. There are some examples on how to measure well-being more properly, such as the OECD Life Index. However, you hardly hear economists, politicians, or industrialists talk about this. The framing is: if we fight global warming the economic system will break or suffer, and jobs will be lost. Odd, because costs will be much higher if we wait any longer. I think it is high time that we discuss what well-being is really about. We need a change of values. I know that it is not easy to realise in a short time, but we have to. This is a huge, urgent problem.

How do you want to change values? More and more, I’m convinced that communication is most important. We need to get out of our bubbles and talk to each other, so we get a common understanding of where we want to go. Get together with people that maybe don’t share your opinion to come to solutions. That’s something we need to do. It’s a question of convince, convince, convince, and convince again, even when not enough is happening and we’re far away from reaching the goals.

That does not sound hopeful! If I wasn’t hopeful, I would not be active for Fridays for Future. We shouldn’t divide society into people who are doing something against global warming, and those who are not. That’s not helping. We have to openly say what is happening and that mistakes have been made in the past, but we have to look forward.

Are you angry with past generations? They should have done more, but they were stuck in the fossil system. I think I was angry when I started in 2019, that we have to do this right now. But I’m not anymore, because I understand why this happened. However, I do blame some people personally, those who actively lobbied against changes out of personal interests.

It was really interesting to notice that the EVS graphs show no big difference between generations in willingness to act against global warming. It’s not young against old. There seems no big intergenerational gap, which is often mentioned by media, politicians, or activists. Perhaps because of the way we express our concerns it looks like our generation are the ones worrying, but we’re not the only ones. That’s hopeful. We should connect more with those older generations, communicate more, not state: you don’t want this. That’s not helping the discussion and not helping in solving climate change. We need to work together.

Is your generation different from protest generations before? They should have done more, but they were stuck in the fossil system

EVS data shows a gap in environmental consciousness between Eastern and Western Europe. Do you experience this yourself? Not really. Fridays for Future is active in Poland, Lithuania and many other Eastern European countries. Last December, we wrote a letter to the European Commissioner for Climate Action with twenty European countries including the Eastern European partners. What I do notice is that in the more autocratic countries, such as Hungary, it is much harder to be active, people get bullied or even harmed. We try to help, by listening and providing moral support, and by making their voices heard.

It’s good to stimulate environmental consciousness in Eastern Europe, and the rest of the world, but we should also take economics and history into account. If I need to be concerned every day if I can feed my family or pay the rent, I probably wouldn’t be so active for Fridays for Future, or maybe not at all. I’m really lucky that I’m in the position to do this. Furthermore, the western world has a historical obligation to take the lead in climate action. Germany is the fourth biggest polluter in history, France and UK are in the top ten as well.

What can we do? Three things. One, if you’re living in a democracy: vote for a politician who wants climate action now. Two: go out on the streets, raise your voice. And three: act yourself, plant a tiny forest in your garden, don’t fly, campaign on social media, do what you can.

Are you, like Greta, setting a ‘green example’ yourself? I do, but I don’t like the question. I can take the train, buy responsible clothes, eat organic food, but that is not something all people can afford, even in western countries. We should focus on the system first. A baby in Germany will have an overshoot in energy consumption and resources just by laying in his bed. I started studying mechanical engineering to contribute to a better world, and switched to environmental sciences when I noticed that technology is not the main problem. Now, I’m switching to bioeconomy. I want to build a bio-based and truly circular economy, most of all we need an alternative for the current system.

“They should have done more, but they were stuck in the fossil system”
Sustainability

Solidarity


Interpersonal trust
The percentage of people who believe most people can be trusted.

- 0 - 9 %
- 10 - 19 %
- 20 - 29 %
- 30 - 39 %
- 40 - 49 %
- 50 - 59 %
- 60 - 69 %
- 70 - 79 %

Most trusting European
- Older
- Higher level of education
- Higher income
- Healthy
- Denmark

Most distrusting European
- Younger
- Lower level of education
- Lower income
- Unhealthy
- Albania
Trusting and welfare

Countries are ranked according to their level of interpersonal trust in red. The purple line represents a country’s wealth, as measured by GDP per capita.


Trusting and crime

Countries are ranked according to their level of interpersonal trust in red. The purple line represents the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, an indication of the country’s crime level.

Source: WHO (2017)

TRUST AND SOLIDARITY

Well-known scholars such as the American political scientist Robert Putnam consider trust the core of social capital, the necessary ‘capital’ to enable societies to function well. Mutual trust does not only stimulate social interaction, solidarity, cooperation and community spirit, but it also drives economic prosperity. Trust decreases the need for formalities, and tends to prevent conflicts and legal processes. It also increases openness to change and innovation, and investments in education.

‘Trust’ is defined by German social scientist Jan Delhey as “the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible”.

Trust expert Eric Uslaner argues that interpersonal trust is a moral value: “We learn it early in life and it is stable over the years for most people.”

While high interpersonal trust is present in thriving societies, countries with low levels of interpersonal trust can get stuck in ‘a social trap’. The lack of trust in others, in government and more broadly in institutions, prevents the implementation of public policies that could remedy social ills. For example, when trust in others and in government is low, support for tax increases that may support higher education or better healthcare may be low because people fear that others will not contribute or that the government will not spend the money well. Interpersonal trust also forms the basis of solidarity: the willingness to support others without immediately getting something in return. Solidarity belongs to European societies’ highest values as underlined by the third part of the famous credo of the French Revolution: Liberté, égalité, fraternité (freedom, equality, brotherhood). Feelings of solidarity are grounded in emotional ties, identification, kindness, moral obligations as well as rational calculations. Someone may offer their help to be polite, or because it is considered fair, kind, or helpful, but also to ‘ensure’ solidarity in return in the future.
CIRCLE OF TRUST
The kind of trust that thrives in modern societies is trust between unfamiliar individuals: trust in someone you don’t know and meet for the first time. This type of trust is called generalised trust or social trust. In high-trust societies, people’s ‘circle of trust’ (in the social sciences called ‘radius of trust’) is wide; this circle includes not only family and friends, but also people that are somehow ‘different’—different in culture, social-economic class, or ancestry.
A remarkable and persistent difference between Eastern and Western European values is the level of interpersonal trust: high in the West, low in the East. Where does this trust gap come from and how can it be closed? After all, trust is believed to stimulate social cohesion and economic growth. Political sociologist Natalia Letki believes institutions are key to trust, whereas discrimination is ‘fatal’.

The belief that others are not out there to harm or deceive you is generally assumed to act as strong ‘glue’ for communities. Trust initiates all kinds of beneficial actions for the collective good like doing voluntary work and a high willingness to pay taxes. Today’s modern, democratic and prosperous societies are all characterised by high levels of interpersonal trust, and this topic is studied comprehensively in social sciences.

For as long as interpersonal trust has been measured, Europe has displayed a ‘trust gap’: people in Western European countries tend to expect good intentions from all whom they meet, whereas the major cultural effects of deprivation affect trust for family and a close circle of friends. In Eastern Europe, the general feeling is: you need to be cautious with people you meet for the first time. Yet, trust is far more complex than this East-West divide, says Nathalia Letki, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Warsaw, Poland.

Cross-national surveys like the European Values Study also show a clear correlation between trust in others and confidence in institutions in a particular country. Moreover, experiments show that poor quality of institutions impacts people’s honesty. People from 25 countries were invited to play the ‘dice-in-a-cup’ game in a laboratory. In this game you roll the dice and get paid according to the numbers reported anonymously. The trustworthiness that participants demonstrated in the game actually correlated with the quality of institutions in their home country. Thus, in a society with well-functioning institutions, such as Sweden or Denmark, trusting others is simply a relatively safe bet.

Thus, trust is a characteristic that can change over time, not a stable value. Cross-national comparisons systematically suggest that trust is rooted in culture; it varies from one country or community to another. From panel data, we also know that it is fairly stable at the individual level. All that points to trust as a value. However, there is also convincing evidence that trust can change: Migrants who move from low-trust to high-trust countries express more trust in other people after a certain period of time. Whether this increased trust is limited to people in their new countries or whether migrants become more trusting towards all people, is still unknown, but the change is evident. We are probably socialised into being trusting or not trusting, it is a value that we learn early in life. However, through experiences, certain interactions, and in certain contexts, this value can change.

Do people who move to low-trust countries, become less trusting, too? That is an interesting question, but almost impossible to study, because migration tends to go the other way. The focus in social sciences has been on the big debate whether migration undermines social cohesion in high-trust communities.

Does it? Does cultural diversity undermine social cohesion? It is very difficult to pin this down because it is almost impossible to separate cultural effects from socioeconomic influences in western societies. Migrants often have a low income, limited social networks, and are also confronted with discrimination, segregation, language barriers and stigmatization. However, there is indeed evidence that cultural diversity decreases social cohesion. Yet, the effect is not strong and far less robust than the effect of a high-trust society that we just talked about.

Actually, Eastern Europe is a very interesting region for studying this topic. In East-Europe, you can find sizable cultural minorities that are the result of migration, but of shifted borders. For example, Hungary has a substantial Slovak minority and Romania has a Hungarian minority. Recent studies in which I was involved show that cultural differences play only a marginal role in trust and cohesion in mixed communities; the effect is negligible compared to, for example, the influence of poverty on trust and cohesion. Cultural minorities seem equally willing to contribute to public goods - with one important exception. When a minority group is discriminated against, their commitment diminishes. Our hypothesis is that a minority will report the norms and values of the majority as a reaction to prejudice and intolerance, thereby preserving a distinct own identity.

There is ongoing debate whether surveys like the European Values Study are able to capture a complex phenomenon such as trust. What do you think? There has indeed been criticism on the standard survey question ‘Can most people be trusted?’ We don’t know exactly how people understand the word ‘trust’ and how they经理 to ‘most people’. Survey research always has this problem; the same question may capture something different in another country. Therefore, the trust question has been tested by formulating it differently in the European Social Survey: ‘Do you trust people whom you meet for the first time?’ Large correlation was found between the two questions. So, I believe the question ‘can most people be trusted?’ works fine and captures reality: people in Eastern parts of Europe have a smaller radius of trust than in Western Europe. Yet, I’m far more interested in trying to understand the mechanisms behind this difference than in pinpointing the exact level of trust.

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Proximity matters

Solidarity and proximity

The percentage of people who feel concerned about the living conditions of neighbours, people from the same country, Europeans and humankind.

Solidarity and proximity

The percentage of people who are concerned about the living conditions of neighbours, people from the same country, Europeans and humankind. Countries are grouped together according to interpersonal trust. Albania and Romania are low-trust countries, Norway and Denmark are high-trust countries.

solidarity, proximity and trust

The percentage of people who are concerned about the living conditions of neighbours, people from the same country, Europeans and humankind. Countries are grouped together according to interpersonal trust. Albania and Romania are low-trust countries, Norway and Denmark are high-trust countries.

by generation

Solidarity with neighbours (%) by generation in three European countries with different trust levels.

In Albania, interpersonal trust is low.
In Denmark, interpersonal trust is high.
In France, interpersonal trust is neither high nor low.

NORDIC GOLD

Worldwide, Scandinavian countries score highest in interpersonal trust. The Nordic Council of Ministers provided a ‘recipe’ for creating trust in a 2020 report entitled ‘Trust - the Nordic Gold’. It includes five instructions for politicians and administrators:

1. Always act with openness and transparency, manage tax revenues with respect, and tackle all signs of corruption.
2. Create a general welfare state that prevents the development of underclasses.
4. Raise the level of education in particular for those with low or incomplete education.
5. Counteract unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment; this implies efficient integration of refugees and migrants in the labour market.

However, whether a recipe for creating interpersonal trust really exists, is still a question open to debate. Like many other social topics, trust is bedevilled by the problem of cause and effect, the chicken-and-egg problem. For example, do people develop higher levels of trust because life has been kind to them, or is life kind to them because they approach it with trust? Societal trust is a complex trait, driven by both individual and societal factors, and influenced by all kinds of historical, cultural, economic and political developments, as well as individual characteristics and personal experiences.
Solidarity with humankind over the years

The rise or fall in solidarity with humankind (in percentage points) between 1999 and 2017. In Austria, solidarity increased most; in Belarus, solidarity declined most.

Solidarity with neighbours over the years

The rise or fall in solidarity with neighbours (in percentage points) between 1999 and 2017. In Austria, solidarity increased most; in the Netherlands, solidarity declined most.

Scope of solidarity

The percentage of people who are concerned about the elderly, the sick, the unemployed and migrants.

WHO DESERVES SUPPORT?

Our scope of solidarity depends on the type of relationship with the recipient: the looser the bond, the lower the intensity. Interpersonal trust tends to ‘widen’ solidarity: when our circle of trust is wider, our solidarity follows. The social sciences distinguish between mechanical and organic solidarity. The first is based on shared norms, values and backgrounds, and is often found in traditional small-scale societies. Organic solidarity is found in modern societies where traditional structures of family, religion and neighbourhoods have ‘loosened’. This organic solidarity is based on specialisation: everyone relies on each other to perform their specified tasks. The welfare state can be seen as a formal party mediating this solidarity.

In modern welfare states, ‘deservingness’ plays an important role in feelings of solidarity: who deserves support and who doesn’t? Studies by Dutch social scientist Wim van Oorschot show that people tend to feel more solidarity with people in need because of events beyond their control. For example, persons in financial troubles because of sickness or a natural disaster will meet more support than those whose problems are caused by problematic drinking or gambling. Solidarity also focuses on ‘real’ needs. When there is a proper social security system in place, people’s solidarity with the unemployed or homeless will diminish. Furthermore, people showing gratitude can count on more solidarity, as well as people we can easily identify with because of similar culture, social status, etc. Finally, people tend to show more solidarity with people that contributed their share to the generation of wealth and welfare (reciprocity).
The Netherlands and Germany: opposite ends?

In the latest European Values Study, Germans demonstrate high solidarity with the elderly, neighbours, migrants, the unemployed and human kind in general, whereas the Dutch seem to care much less. What causes this difference? The two neighbouring countries are highly alike in terms of economic development and culture. Social scientist Tim Reeskens, EVS Programme Director for the Netherlands, and Achim Goerres Professor of Empirical Political Science from Germany attempt to clarify the issue.

Surprised by the difference?

Tim Reeskens: “Very much. Studies on philanthropy show that the Dutch are among the most generous people worldwide and percentages of volunteers are record high too. Are you familiar with the ‘lost wallet experiment’? The Dutch bring the wallet and its content to the police most often.”

Achim Goerres is also surprised. “In the charts on solidarity, Germany is surrounded by the ‘usual suspects’: Austria, Denmark and Sweden, whereas the Netherlands is found together with Hungary, Russia or Azerbaijan. That seems quite odd.”

In 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel said Wir schaffen das (‘we will manage’) when over one million refugees arrived in Germany; Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte repeatedly stressed the importance of Opvang in de regio (‘shelter in the region’). That’s quite a difference.

Goerres: “Merkel’s words and the public discussions during the refugee crisis have definitely raised the sense of community in Germany, but at the same time the polarisation in opinions on this topic. Therefore, I’m curious to see the distribution in the German and Dutch scores; country averages can be deceiving.” Reeskens: “We know from research in social sciences that political rhetoric does not influence people’s feelings of solidarity to the extent that a country will end up on the other end of a scale. Feelings of solidarity are generally quite stable, rooted in historical and cultural contexts. It also is remarkable that the Netherlands and Germany are both among countries with the highest interpersonal trust, but differ much in solidarity.”

In which way do the Netherlands and Germany differ, which might explain a gap in solidarity?

Reeskens: “Perhaps in type of welfare state. The Netherlands has many characteristics of a liberal welfare system, for example, more market influence in the health care system and individual-based social rights with an increasing emphasis on conditionality and individual responsibility.”

Goerres: “In the Netherlands, there has been much more discussion on who should or should not benefit from the welfare state. Politician Pim Fortuyn initiated this debate and the great deal of media attention for him and his murder in 2002 may have triggered lower solidarity levels. This discussion on deservingness has only recently started here in Germany. However, there are far more similarities than differences in the welfare state type, but also in general. That’s also my personal experience, I studied in the Netherlands, and have visited the country often since I was young.”

Conclusion: no explanation?

Goerres: “I cannot think of one hypothesis explaining this large difference, no. Although the European Values Study is the Ferrari under the comparative surveys: might it be a methodological issue?” Reeskens: “The Dutch score definitely seems an outlier. Achim and I had a look together at the exact Dutch and German wordings in the questionnaires. The Dutch translation of ‘concern’ could lead to a different understanding, a stronger commitment, which may lead to lower responses. I’ve put a red flag on this item for future scrutiny by the EVS methodology group.”

Solidarity with the elderly over the years

The rise or fall in solidarity with the elderly (in percentage points) between 1999 and 2017.

Solidarity with the unemployed over the years

The rise or fall in solidarity with the unemployed (in percentage points) between 1999 and 2017.
Solidarity and unemployment rate

Countries are ranked according to their level of solidarity with the unemployed. The purple line represents the unemployment rate in 2017.

Source: OECD (2017)

Age gap in solidarity

The gap in solidarity between the Silent Generation and Generation Z (in percentage points). The older Silent Generation generally shows more concern for the elderly, except in Sweden.

Trust and voluntary work

The percentage of people doing voluntary work (x-axis) versus the level of trust (y-axis).

Limits to tolerance

Least favourite neighbour

The percentage of people who do not want to live next door to drug addicts, homosexuals, Roma or Sinti, and Jews.
The percentage of people who do not want to live next door to drug addicts, homosexuals, Roma or Sinti, and Jews since 1990. Countries are ordered according to interpersonal trust. Bulgaria is a low-trust country. Denmark is a high-trust country.

Intolerance over the years

The percentage of people who think being homosexuality is never justified by gender. Countries are ordered according to interpersonal trust. Bulgaria is a low-trust country. Denmark is a high-trust country.

Acceptance of homosexuality

The percentage of people who trust the police, parliament, the civil service and the justice system.

Police, parliament and press - trustworthy or not?

Trust in ...

The percentage of people who trust the police, parliament, the civil service and the justice system.

... the police

... parliament

... the civil service

... the justice system
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
Confidence or trust in institutions is often not based on individual experience, one seldomly personally knows the people involved. Moreover, actual encounters with organisations such as the army or press may be rare. Nevertheless, people build a mental picture of institutions such as the police or parliament based on the news, ‘reputation’, and hearsay.

This ‘institutional’, often called ‘political’, trust is an important characteristic in the functioning of a society. A government or police force that has lost its citizens’ trust encounters large difficulties in performing its tasks, which may lead to even less trust. On the other hand, institutional trust can build institutions that can help governments perform effectively, which again raises trust. Thus, there seem to be both upward and downward spirals of trust.

Effectiveness is an important factor in institutional trust, but may not be decisive. Institutions such as parliament and city councils are elected, while others function through more neutral profession-oriented processes, think of healthcare or the educational system. Citizens are likely to judge partisan institutions not only based on efficacy and efficiency, but also on the goals and effects of their decisions. Trust is therefore more volatile and may even change ‘with the issues of the day’.

Trust in institutions
The percentage of trust and distrust in various institutions. For every institution, the confidence in the country closest to the closest to the European average is shown.

Scandals and secularisation
Trust in the institutions of Christian religion - the churches - is expected to decline in Europe because of ongoing processes of secularisation in many countries. Moreover, trust in churches has been undermined by scandals of physical and sexual abuse of children and women in the past decades. However, the picture is more complex. First, because religion has regained popularity in many East-European countries where churches were opposed and even forbidden by communist governments. Furthermore, secularisation may lead to a smaller group of more devoted churchgoers who have a high confidence in the churches, while the non-churchgoing population does not necessarily lose all confidence in an institution that is more ‘remote’ in daily life.

Trust in the church over the years
The rise or fall in trust in the church (in percentage points) since 1990. In Finland, trust has risen most; in Poland, trust has decreased most.
Trust in the justice system over the years

The rise or fall in trust in the justice system (in percentage points) since 1990. In Estonia, trust has risen most; in Bulgaria, trust has decreased by nearly thirty percentage points.

Trust in the justice system in Eastern Europe over the years

The percentage of people in Eastern Europe who trust the justice system.

Trust in the press

The percentage of people who trust the press.

... in Great Britain

Trust in the press over the years in Great Britain.

... in Finland

Trust in press over the years in Finland.
Press versus social media

Trust in traditional press over social media in percentage points. In Finland, people have much more confidence in newspapers, radio or television; people in Georgia feel social media are more trustworthy.

Solidarity and inequality

Support for more equality

The percentage of people who believe it is (very) important to eliminate great inequalities in society.

- 50 - 59%
- 60 - 69%
- 70 - 79%
- 80 - 89%
- 90 - 100%
Equality and income

The support for eliminating inequalities by income level. Countries are grouped according to inequality in income (Gini-coefficient). In Russia, incomes are more equal than in Azerbaijan.

Trust and equality

Support for eliminating great inequalities (y-axis) versus interpersonal trust (y-axis). The support for more inequality tends to be highest in countries with low levels of interpersonal trust such as Portugal and Albania.

Equality and political preference

The political gap (in percentage points) between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in support of eliminating great inequalities. In Sweden and other Western European countries, ‘left’ is far more in favour of eliminating inequalities than ‘right’. However, in other parts of Europe, this is not evident.

Equality and type of welfare state

The percentage of people who believe it is (very) important to eliminate great inequalities, by generation. Countries are ordered according to welfare state type. Finland and Sweden represent the social-democratic type, France and Germany represent the continental/corporatist type, Great Britain represents the liberal type, Spain and Italy represent the Mediterranean type, and Poland and the Czech Republic as new member states represent a mix of the liberal and corporatist type.

Basic needs for all

How important is it that society guarantees basic needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothing, education and health?

[Graphs and charts as described in the original text]
Democracy
Democracy

The democratisation process in Europe has stagnated after the turn of the millennium, warn ‘watch dogs’ organisations such as Freedom House. They report erosion of fundamental rights, particularly in some young democracies in Eastern Europe. Although a large majority of European countries are stable, high-quality democracies, in some civil rights have deteriorated to the point where they can hardly be qualified as democracies. Moreover, Europe still includes authoritarian regimes, too, such as Belarus, Russia and Azerbaijan. The stagnation in the democratisation process is a grave concern for the continent where the cradle of democracy stood.

Indeed, the world has witnessed a strong rise in the number of democracies in the twentieth century. Around 1900, twenty percent of all nations were democracies, after WWII this percentage had doubled, and the world passed the milestone of fifty percent of democratically ruled countries around 1990. Today, roughly sixty percent of all countries are considered democratic. However, over the past decades the democratisation process shows signs of stagnation or even a roll-back. Between 2009 and 2018, the share of not-free countries increased from 25 to 26 percent, while the share of free countries declined from 46 to 44 percent.

In times of economic or physical hardship, democratic governance may be perceived as inefficient compared to strong and decisive leadership. A notorious example is the fast-rise of the NSADP party, led by Adolf Hitler, in the German parliament during the Great Depression. A more recent example that democracy is vulnerable is the 2021 Capitol attack by Trump supporters who demanded annulment of the presidential elections. It shocked the world and President-Elect Joe Biden organised a Summit of Democracy with eighty national leaders as “democratic rights and norms are under threat around the world”.

In today’s Europe, worries about democracy predominantly concern the rise of populist political parties. Examples include Front National in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PIS, ‘Law and Justice’) in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. These right-wing parties hold strong nationalistic views, emphasise traditional family values, are opposed to immigration and often gather around a ‘strong leader’ with authoritarian tendencies. Over the past decade, Poland and Hungary, both led by a populist government, have collided several times with the European Union because of undemocratic or discriminatory policies, which are believed to erode democracy in Europe. The union even started a unique infringement procedure against Poland for violations of EU law.

Democracy: steadfast or eroding?

The percentage of people who believe democracy is important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>95–100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>90–94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>85–89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80–84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>75–79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>65–69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>60–64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>55–59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>50–54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>45–49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>40–44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>35–39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>30–34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>25–29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>20–24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15–19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10–14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5–9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opinions on the importance of democracy for four countries.

- Not important
- Neutral
- Important
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY – WHAT DO YOU MEASURE?

Measuring support for democracy is ‘tricky’. A question may be understood as an inquiry into one’s support for general principles behind democracy such as fair elections, the right to vote, free speech and patriotism. However, it may also be understood as a question about the functioning of political, democratic institutions: parliament, the government, etcetera. Canadian political scientist David Easton calls this diffuse versus specific support. When citizens have high aspirations of democracy (high diffuse support) but are dissatisfied with its functioning (low specific support) a democratic deficit arises, which may undermine political legitimacy. However, it may also signal the rise of the ‘critical citizen’ who is supportive of democratic values in general, but takes a critical, evaluative stance when it comes to the functioning of political agencies.

A similar problem occurs when people are asked about their confidence in parliament or government. Answers may refer to the functioning of these institutions themselves but may also reflect experiences within a particular context, for example the response of parliament or government during an economic crisis. Matters outside the political realm can thus influence people’s answers. The economic performance during the Great Recession has, for example, had an impact on institutional trust, and the more vulnerable social groups reacted more strongly to economic fluctuations. In social sciences these are called endogenous and exogenous explanations.

Level of democracy

Countries are ranked (yellow bars) according to the level of democracy that people report in their own country (expressed in percentages on the left axis). The green dots represent the Global Freedom Status, as measured by Freedom House (right axis). A score of 1-2.5 is labelled as ‘free’, 3-5 ‘partly free’, and 5.5-7 ‘not free’. In Denmark, for example, the self-reported high level of democracy and Freedom House status are in good agreement; in Azerbaijan the people’s opinion and that of Freedom House do not match.

Source: Freedom House (2017)

(Diss)satisfaction with the political system

Countries are ranked according to how (dis)satisfied people are with the political system.

*Non-democratic countries according to Freedom House
YOUNG AND INSECURE
After WWII, a Silent Revolution took place in economically thriving western countries. The rise in wealth and security opened up people to new ideas and led to more tolerance towards outgroups. With each new generation so-called post-materialist values such as self-expression, environmental protection, gender equality and tolerance became more important.

However, especially in times of crisis, an ‘authoritarian reflex’ may be triggered. Particularly the older generations may oppose these ‘novelties’ in an attempt to preserve the traditional culture and social system. American political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have called this phenomenon a ‘cultural backlash’. According to these scientists, this reflex most often occurs in older generations, more particular in religious, white and older men.

Other political scientists, however, claim that this authoritarian reflex is most prominent among the young. The political climate may no longer fit the interests of younger people in times of crisis and insecurity, leading to distrust of liberal elites and de-alignment from the mainstream political parties. Especially in times of rapid societal changes, new generations may develop different political ideologies and movements that conflict with those of older generations. This could lead to a generational reversal in support to democracy and its core values than the older generations, indicating a crisis in political legitimacy or even a democratic deconsolidation.

According to these scientists, this reflex could lead to a generational reversal in which the youngest are less committed to democracy and its core values than the older generations, indicating a crisis in political legitimacy or even a democratic deconsolidation.

Rejection of democracy
The percentage of people who reject democracy in 1999, 2008 and 2017. Shown are the three countries with the lowest, the most average and the highest percentages of rejection.

A good idea? Rule by ...

... a ‘strong man’
The percentage of people who support the idea of having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.

... the military
The percentage of people who believe it is good to have the army lead the country.

... technocrats
The percentage of people who think it is a good idea to have experts and specialists, not the government, rule the country.
**Confidence in political parties, parliament and government**

The percentage of people who have confidence in the political parties, parliament and the government in their country. Shown are the European countries with the least, the most average and the highest confidence in the political institutions.

- **Political parties**
- **Parliament**
- **Government**

### Essentials of democracy

What are the essential characteristics for a truly democratic system? The support for six characteristics: people choosing their leaders in free election, women having the same rights as men, having civil rights that protect people from state oppression, government taxing the rich and subsidising the poor, people obeying the rulers, the army taking over when government is incompetent. Shown is the support in three democratic countries (left) and three non-democratic countries (right).

### Democratic deficiencies

The percentage of people who report shortcomings in democracy in three democratic countries (left) and three non-democratic countries (right). It concerns unfair media coverage during elections, buying votes, prevention of opposition candidates from running in elections, unfair counting of votes, threats at the polling stations.

### Men are better politicians

The percentage of men and women who believe that men make better politicians than women.
Political interest and activism highest in North-West Europe

Interest in politics
The percentage of people who are interested in politics.
- 20 - 29 %
- 30 - 39 %
- 40 - 49 %
- 50 - 59 %
- 60 - 69 %
- 70 - 79 %

Following political news
The percentages of people who consume political news via TV, newspaper, radio and social media (stacked) on a daily basis.

Importance in life
The percentage of people who find that politics play an important role in life.
Following political news

... by generation

The percentage of people who follow politics on a daily basis on television and on social media in five countries.

![Graph showing the percentage of people following politics by generation.](image)

**Television**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>BG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silent Generation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby boomers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation X</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennials</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Z</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social media**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>BG</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silent Generation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby boomers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation X</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennials</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Z</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Independent media

The percentage of people who believe that the national media provide information free from political or commercial pressure.

Source: Eurobarometer (2016)

![Map showing the percentage of people believing in independent media.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>PL</th>
<th>BG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>30-35%</td>
<td>35-40%</td>
<td>40-45%</td>
<td>45-50%</td>
<td>50-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>40-45%</td>
<td>45-50%</td>
<td>50-55%</td>
<td>55-60%</td>
<td>60-65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
<td>25-30%</td>
<td>30-35%</td>
<td>35-40%</td>
<td>40-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10-15%</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
<td>25-30%</td>
<td>30-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0-5%</td>
<td>5-10%</td>
<td>10-15%</td>
<td>15-20%</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STREET POLITICS

For a long time, the word mass-protest conjured nostalgic images of the large peace demonstrations in the 1980s in Western Europe or the marches against communist regimes in Eastern European countries in 1989, before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 2010s, however, renewed the pictures. They brought a sharp rise in street protests, worldwide and in Europe. Europeans went to the streets to protest for climate action, and youngsters inspired by Swedish Greta Thunberg started mass school strikes. People also took to the streets to demonstrate against migration, against discrimination and fascism, against police brutality (Black Lives Matter), the political system (‘yellow vests’, ‘gilets jaunes’), corruption (in Eastern Europe) and for more democracy (Belarus, Russia). In 2020, the COVID-19 lockdowns nearly dissolved political protesters from the streets, but soon protests returned, this time to demand lifting of corona-related restrictions. Political protests are a sign of democracy in action; people have the right to demonstrate and call for political changes. In democratic countries, they have, however, also become a visible sign of the dissatisfaction of people with the political system. In authoritarian regimes such as Russia or Belarus, the arrest of protesters are a clear sign of undemocratic, political oppression.
The willingness to undertake political actions since 1990. Shown is the trend for three countries with low, average and high willingness. (Scale: 0 stands for no willingness at all, 4 willingness or actual engagement in various forms of political activism).

While in Italy people seem to move away from the political centre towards the left and right wings, political preferences in Portugal seems to converge. Sounding the alarm bell for Italy is not necessary, says Italian sociologist Ferruccio Biolcati (University of Milan), also a member of the European Values Study Methodology Group. In calm Portugal change is ahead, predicts Portuguese political scientist Pedro Magalhães (University of Lisbon), a member of the EVS Theory Group.

Are you surprised by the EVS results on political preferences in your country?

Ferruccio Biolcati: “No, the results for Italy are in line with other data. The political landscape in Italy was shocked dramatically in 1992 when systematic corruption and illegal financing of the traditional parties was revealed.” Pedro Magalhães: “I did not expect any substantial changes; politics in Portugal have been very stable over the past decades, but these data show a shift towards the political center. That’s indeed surprising.”

Fragmentation in Italy, and the opposite trend in Portugal. Do you have an explanation?

Biolcati: “In the early 1990s, the traditionally important political parties - the Christian democratic Democrazia Cristiana and the socialist Partito Socialista Italiano - vanished because of the corruption scandals. The political gap has been filled by a range of new parties. Right and right-wing parties were especially successful such as Forza Italia and Lega Nord. They made migration a priority topic. This explains fragmentation and a shift to the right.” Magalhães: “I do not have a good explanation for the shift in Portugal towards the political middle, only some thoughts. People may opt for what seems the ‘safe’ middle because they are less politically engaged or because they find it more difficult to place themselves on a classical left-right scale. The green party PAN, for example, claims to be neither right nor left. The conservative party PSD also consequently labels itself centrist after criticism that its response to the economic crisis in 2008 was too rightist, and this may influence the responses of their sympathisers. But honestly, I find the shift quite a mystery.”

Portugal seems almost immune to populism and polarization. Magalhães: “In Portugal, the rise of a well-educated middle class started relatively late, and also today we have a large working class and a comparatively large number of small business owners. The economic structure resembles that of modern European countries of twenty years ago. Only recently, a populist radical right party entered the political arena, as well as parties focusing on animal rights, the environment, and LGBTQI+-rights. Traditionally, politics have been about socio-economic topics. Furthermore, Portugal has been more an emigration than an immigration country. Therefore, migration is not a hot topic, even for the populist party.”

Radical right is clearly present in Italy, does it set off any alarm bells?

Biolcati: “Of course, there are concerns, but no alarm. Democracy is not at risk when you look at the high support for democracy in Italy.”

Do Southern European countries have a lot in common in politics?

Magalhães: “Disinterest and mistrust in politics were believed to unite Southern European countries, but that is not true today - at least not in Portugal. I see more differences than similarities between the southern countries. For example, until recently populism didn’t get a grip in Portugal, whereas Italy is known for it.” Biolcati: “The economic situation of the southern countries may be quite comparable, but the dominant factor in Italian politics has been the crisis of 1992, which was a national crisis.”
Political activism

Signing petitions
The readiness for political activism by signing petitions.

Joining boycotts
The readiness for political activism by joining in boycotts.

Demonstrate
The readiness for political activism by attending (lawful) demonstrations.

Unofficial strike
The support for political activism by joining unofficial strikes.

Political activism

Have done
Might do
Would never do

Signing petitions

Joining boycotts

Demonstrate

Unofficial strike
A changing political landscape?

Political preference
The deviation from the political middle on a left-right (1-10) scale. Negative scores thus indicate a more 'left' population; positive scores indicate a more 'right' population.

Violence defensible
The percentage of people who believe that political violence is (almost) always justified.
POLARISATION
Politics, and society itself, are believed to have become more polarised: opinions on political issues differ more and are becoming more opposed, resulting in more heated discussions and more difficulties in reaching a compromise. Polarisation is believed to be fuelled by the rise of social media. Users tend to seek like-minded friends and groups creating an ‘echo well’ or ‘bubble’ that strengthens their own opinions and limits their exposure to different thoughts and arguments.

Another explanation of increased polarisation in politics is today’s ‘diploma democracy’, a term introduced by political scientists Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille. Nowadays, most parliamentarians are highly educated; lower educated politicians have become an exception. This comes with the risk of neglecting the problems of the lower educated, who may disconnect from politics and politicians who do not seem to understand ‘the bottom of society’.

Traditionally, class and/or religion formed the basis for polarisation in society and politics, but economic modernisation and secularisation have eroded these dividing lines. Instead, educational level has become the dominant dividing line in many industrialised societies. Despite modern communication technologies and mobility, another frequently described social division is between urban centres and the more rural periphery.
Fiercely defending freedom and human rights?

HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL RIGHTS, SOCIAL RIGHTS
Being human provides everyone with human rights as stated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). These basic, fundamental rights include, for example, the right to be born free, and equal in dignity and rights, and the right of security of person. These rights are incorporated into international law and national constitutions.

A common categorisation of human rights is the divide into civil, political and social rights. Civil rights emanated first, as political philosopher Thomas H. Marshall explains in his classic essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’. According to Marshall, civil rights are “necessary for individual freedom” and include the rule of law, freedom of speech, and property rights. These civil rights evoked a demand for political rights, exemplified by universal suffrage, which grants individuals the right to “participate in the exercise of political power”. Civil and political rights are described by the Czech-French lawyer Karel Vasák as ‘negative rights’ because they protect members of respective political communities against abuses of state powers. The expansion of these civil and political rights across western societies took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

After widespread introduction of civic and political rights, social rights evolved, enabling all members of a nation-state to enjoy and to share at least a basic level of social-economic and cultural well-being.

The introduction of social rights coincided with the introduction and the expansion of the welfare state after WWII, and are labelled as ‘positive’ rights: they allow individuals to make demands from the state.

Research by social scientists Tim Reeskens and Wim van Oorschot shows that Europeans are slightly more supportive of civil and political rights than of social rights. Put differently, people find it more important that there is equality before the law, freedom of speech, and free elections, than that all incomes are equal. At the same time, Europeans also believe that social rights are less fulfilled than civil and political liberties.
Human Freedom

The Cato Institute’s Human Freedom Index ranks countries according to rule of law, personal and economic safety, freedom of movement and expression, and a number of other human rights related personal and economic freedoms. The index has a scale from 0 to 10.

Source: Cato Institute (2017)

Respect for core values

People’s opinion on the importance of countries respecting EU core values

Source: Eurobarometer (2017)

Priority values

EU citizens were asked to list a ‘Top 3’ of most important personal values. Shown are the support percentages for the most frequently chosen values in six countries.

Source: Eurobarometer (2017)
Control allowed …?

… camera surveillance
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to use camera surveillance in public areas.

... monitoring internet
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to monitor all its citizens' information exchanges on the internet.

... ‘spying’
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to secretly collect information about every citizen.

... by generation
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to use camera surveillance in public areas in two Eastern European and two Western European countries by generation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation Z</th>
<th>Millennials</th>
<th>Generation X</th>
<th>Baby boomers</th>
<th>Silent Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 9 %</td>
<td>10 - 19 %</td>
<td>20 - 29 %</td>
<td>30 - 39 %</td>
<td>40 - 49 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59 %</td>
<td>60 - 69 %</td>
<td>70 - 79 %</td>
<td>80 - 89 %</td>
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... by generation
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to monitor all its citizens' information exchanges on the internet in two Eastern European and two Western European countries by generation.

... by generation
The percentage of people who are willing to grant their government the right to secretly collect information about every citizen in two Eastern European and two Western European countries by generation.
“Age is the new divide in politics”

Today’s politics is not a battle between the left and the right; the main chasm stems from moral issues, argues Pippa Norris. We are witnessing a cultural backlash, a counterrevolution against liberal values. Often populist politicians succeed in attracting traditionalists’ votes with ‘hot button politics’ on issues like LGBTQI+ rights, race, abortion or multiculturalism.

Why have populists gained popularity from the ‘cultural backlash’? They currently voice traditionalist views. Populism is not an ideology; it is a set of values in rhetoric. ‘You cannot trust the elites’ is a prominent one, another one is ‘power to the ordinary people’. Traditionalists are often from the older, less-educated generations. In democratic systems, they do not feel represented; politicians are often highly educated, and not advocating the issues they feel important.

Nostalgia seems to play an important role, too. As illustrated by Brexit, the backlash is often fuelled by nostalgia. Boris Johnson claims that ‘global Britain’ can once again be a world power. Putin’s views on restoring the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire also fits this thesis. Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’, too. Nostalgia and nationalism are part of the appeal.

Why have populist parties been successful in some countries, but not in all? Much depends on the electoral system. In Eastern Europe, support for traditional values remains greater, which results in large support for populist parties. In Western Europe with more liberal values, populist parties can succeed in proportional representative electoral systems, but often mainstream parties keep them out of government. The Westminster elections resemble the US winner-takes-all system for the US House of Representatives. British populist parties like UKIP have done well in the European Parliament elections with proportional representation, but not in Westminster elections. Whenever anti-European sentiment spurred UKIP support in the polls, the Conservative Party would incorporate the issue to get the majority needed to get in power. Trump has never won a majority of the popular votes. In 2016, he lost by three million votes to Clinton, and in 2020, by seven million to Biden.

How long will the cultural backlash last? The Western world is at a tipping point. Younger generations holding more liberal values are becoming the majority. That’s why the debate is so heated. Support for traditional views has decreased to 40-45 percent, which can still result in a parliamentary majority - depending on the electoral system and turnout - but once these numbers shrink to 30-35 percent, that is no longer a possibility. The balance will shift to the libertarians in the longer term because of demography. However, that will not happen overnight. It is a long-term process.

We call it the Silent Revolution, would you call it a loud backlash? No, I would call it a silent counterrevolution, too. There is large hesitation to speak up on traditional views on race, sex, migration, nationalism or migration because of the intolerance of the cancel culture. Populist leaders usually don’t use the direct racist or sexist language of the 1950s to appeal to white traditionalists today; instead, they use more socially acceptable language in party speeches and campaigns. Orbán, for example, speaks of Christian values and Hungarian families. Yet, occasionally the mask slips. Of course, there is also the dangerous group of young hard-line White Supremacists who use hate speech and advocate violence, but these remain small minorities.

Some political scientists have pointed at younger generations disappointed by their economic perspectives as the drivers of the cultural backlash and the rise of populism. Yes, and this argument of ‘left-behind’ sectors get a lot of attention, but I don’t believe that it is supported by the survey evidence. We, and others too, have found consistent evidence that the older generation, not class, is crucial for support of traditional views. We, and others too, have found consistent evidence that the older generation, not class, is crucial for support of traditional views. We see the same pattern on many issues and in multiple countries, whereas these outlier results come from just a few, mostly Anglo-American countries.

Social media are often said to fuel populists’ success. Do you agree? Social media is a two-edged sword, a tool that is and will be used by both sides, traditionalists and liberals. In the beginning, social media were only used by the young and educated, but today by everybody. It acts as a reinforcing force for one’s own values. Did the people who stormed the Capitol use social media? Yes, they did, but many also got their information from Fox News and similar channels on cable television.

Many populist leaders have befriended Putin. Do you expect this could backfire because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? I’m actually far more interested in the impact of this horrifying war on moral values. Populism is just one topic I’ve studied. Europe has not experienced such clear aggression since 1945; the wars in former Yugoslavia were much more ambiguous. I’m highly interested in the impact on changing attitudes towards classic populist issues including migration. Ukrainian refugees differ from those arriving in Europe around the crisis of 2015. Refugees are now often vulnerable women and children, many speaking English, in contrast to young men from Syria, Afghanistan or sub-Saharan Africa. And what about the support for democracy, will it rise? It’s too early to tell at this moment, but this war may result in large shifts, especially because of the images of brutal bombing of civilian populations and wanton destruction in the heart of modern Europe.

Donald Trump, Victor Orbán, Boris Johnson, but also Vladimir Putin are representatives of the cultural backlash that makes today’s politics about moral values. These leaders voice the concerns of older generations, of traditionalists who no longer see their values reflected in modern societies, according to Pippa Norris, a political scientist specialised in Comparative Politics, active in the World Values Survey, and co-author with Ronald Inglehart of the 2019 book Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Since the 1960s and 1970s, younger well-educated generations caused a Silent Revolution in politics by adopting liberal values. However, traditionalists long to bring back ‘the good old days’, long for the societies of their youth when traditional views on family, sexuality, religion and nationality were the norm. Norris: “Steadily through demographic shifts the younger, well-educated generations have become a majority, which has brought us at a cultural tipping point”.

What topic sparks your current interest? My new research is on the question whether the culture of a country reflects the type of its regime. In particular, how much genuine support is there in an authoritarian regime? WVS and EVS surveys implore into public support for a strong leader and for rule by the army, but I want to add new questions monitoring the more grey practices, the signs of democratic erosion due to both the cancel culture and authoritarian tendencies. Think of laws against free speech or hate speech. Should schools teach on race and sexual diversity, or not? May you prevent politicians with anti-democratic ideas from running in elections? I want to get an idea of the support for anti-authoritarian practices in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Fortunately, the WVS includes many different political regimes, including more difficult countries to conduct survey research in, such as Libya, Iran and Myanmar.

Is it possible to get honest answers on political issues in authoritarian regimes? We ask about religious topics in countries like Pakistan, and on race in the US. In survey research, you always need to ask yourself if you get socially desirable or authentic answers. Moreover, there are ways to measure response bias in surveys, for example by experiments splitting respondents into two groups and comparing answers to both direct and indirect questions. We need to repeat questions in successive survey waves exactly to discover long-term trends, but we also need to innovate a little in every wave to continuously improve our methods.
### European country information

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**Sources:**
- European Union
- Worldbank
- Wikipedia
European Values: data, research and education

In this Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times, the values, beliefs, opinions, and attitudes of Europeans are displayed on a wide range of topics in informative graphs, charts and maps. These images are based on survey data collected within the framework of the European Values Study (EVS), a large-scale, longitudinal and cross-national survey research project on basic human values. The project was initiated by the European Values Systems Study Group (EVSSG) in the late 1970s, aiming to uncover the moral and social values underlying European social and political institutions and governing conduct.

The European Values Study attempted to address issues such as: Do Europeans share common values? Are values changing in Europe and, if so, in what directions? What are the implications of these changes for European unity? These questions and issues are still relevant in contemporary Europe.

To answer such questions, surveys were organised in all member states of the European Community. A first wave of surveys took place in 1981 and interviews were conducted in ten countries.

In order to explore value changes, successive waves of surveys were carried out in 1990, 1999, 2008, and most recently in 2017. The 2008 survey included all European nations from the European Union as part of the Erasmus+ programme, to study policy makers address them is an important topic for reflection. It is the ambition of the recently established Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence of European Values at Tilburg University, funded by the European Union, to bring together the values, opinions and politics on major societal challenges. Data and expertise from the European Values Study are brought together with renowned experts on Europe from all core disciplines at Tilburg University. Sharing knowledge is a key pillar of CoEV (www.centreforvalues.eu).

The findings of the European Values Study presented in this Atlas will be of interest to a broad audience: from social scientists to policymakers and students of policy.”

The 2008 survey included all European nations from Iceland to Turkey, and from Portugal to Russia. The latest wave in 2017 included no less than 61 countries. Thus, this Atlas of European Values graphically illustrates the rich diversity of values and beliefs of the more than 800 million Europeans living inside and outside the European Union today, revealing unity and diversity, change and continuity in Europe in turbulent times at a glance.

The findings once again illustrate that although Europe’s culture is changing, this transformation does not seem to occur at the same pace in all countries. There appear to be sometimes deep and long-lasting differences in basic beliefs, attitudes and opinions in Europe. Cultural and social changes appear to depend on the stage of socio-economic development and historical and political factors specific to a given nation.

The survey data collected by the European Values Study are also a valuable resource for the education of young people about Europe, helping them to better understand each other. After all, we are living in turbulent times in which globalisation has forced us to deal with an increasing diversity of people, and neo-liberalism has challenged the idea of the welfare state and thus equality. Both developments stress the importance of the individual and the concept of identity: the answer to the question ‘who am I?’ becomes more and more important. Especially for young people it is difficult to find a balance between the diversity in society and their own identity.

Values education (values clarification and values communication) can help to get a clearer idea of how to position oneself within a diversity of opinions, and which explanations there might be for own standpoints but also for the viewpoints of others.

The Erasmus+ project European Values in Education (EVALUE) wants to realise this effort within a European context. Despite urgent calls for citizenship and values education, research shows that teachers in all European countries struggle to teach about controversial issues and that citizenship and values education is often neglected in schools. Several reasons exist for this, but pressure to adhere to the curriculum, lack of expertise in developing and guiding teaching activities and the absence of suitable tools are some of them. In reaction to this, governments emphasise the importance of citizenship education and values education and look to develop various initiatives.

The aim of the project is therefore to bridge this gap by offering means and teaching materials fit for this purpose and to match curriculum needs. It also aims to provide strategies for developing own teaching ideas, while using the developed tools in the role of curriculum maker.

The website www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu (available in eight languages) offers several interactive tools developed by the project partners ECE University, Izmir (Turkey), EUROCEO (Belgium), Fontys University of Applied Sciences (the Netherlands), KU Leuven (Belgium), Tilburg University (the Netherlands) and Univerzita Mateja Bela, Banska Bystrica (Slovakia). These tools give teachers, students and other visitors the opportunity to:

- Create interactive maps displaying how Europeans think about a wide range of topics and to compare these values across countries, time, and between different groups in society, based on the high-quality survey data of the European Values Studies (EVS), complemented with survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Social Survey (ESS) and general data on country characteristics.
- Create a digital classroom to display students’ values and to compare these with the values of country populations or different groups in society.
- Use teaching materials, lesson plans, a curriculum framework and background documentation to develop lessons about value education. Themes covered are migration, environment, democracy, tolerance, and solidarity.
This Atlas of European Values: Change and Continuity in Turbulent Times presents a selection of the survey data from the European Values Study (EVS) for 2017 in more than 200 informative graphs, charts, and maps. In order to detect developments of stability or change in value patterns since the 1980s, these findings were compared with the data of the previous EVS waves. A first wave of the European Values Study took place in 1981 among citizens of the 15 European Union member states of that time. In 1990, a second wave of surveys was carried out in 25 European countries. The 1999 wave was administered in 33 European countries and included several new topics, such as questions on solidarity, social capital, democracy, and work ethics. The fourth wave was carried out in 2008 and included a total of 47 European countries/regions. New questions in this wave concerned immigration, nationalism, and the environment. The last wave of surveys, on which this Atlas is based, took place in 2017 in 36 countries. For this wave, too, some new questions were developed, including on the meaning of democracy, on what it means to be European, and on government surveillance.

For each wave, a master questionnaire was produced in the English language, which was translated into the national languages. CentERdata Research Institute at Tilburg University (www.centerdata.nl/en) developed a unique online computer programme to monitor the translation process in the various countries. Until 2008, the surveys were administered through face-to-face interviews from samples of all adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Innovating in new ways of data collection, in the 2017 wave several countries experimented with a mixed mode strategy, which included the CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Inteview) mode of data collection.

Great efforts were taken to guarantee the highest scientific standards in developing, translating, and preceding the master questionnaire and the field questionnaires, high-quality fieldwork, and standardised data processing and documentation. A set of guidelines and recommendations was set up and the whole process of data collection and data processing was guided and monitored by the EVS Methodology Group. Detailed information on the translation of the questionnaire, the sampling procedures, fieldwork, weighting, national codes etc. can be found on the European Values Study website: www.europeanvaluesstudies.eu. All data and documentation are freely available and can be obtained through this website at the CESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne (www.cesisg.org).

Maps and charts

The maps in this Atlas may not be entirely geographically accurate. In order to include all European countries in a way that properly distinguishes the nuances of each country, the maps have been slightly adjusted, which may yield a geographically distorted picture of Europe. For example, details of the coastal line of Norway are left out. On the maps, the differences in value orientations are indicated by a variety of colours. The colour grey is used when no or no comparable data were available.

Throughout this Atlas, we distinguish between five generations: Generation Z: people born between 1997 - 2010, Millennials: born between 1981 - 1996, Generation X: born between 1965 - 1980, Baby boomers: born between 1946 - 1964, and the Silent Generation: born between 1925 - 1945. Three levels of education (low, middle and high) were defined, based on a question about the highest level of education the respondent had reached. ‘Low’ level indicates no education, inadequately completed primary education, completed (compulsory) primary education, or first stage of basic secondary education. ‘Middle’ level education includes secondary education and post-secondary non-tertiary education. A ‘high’ level of education means a tertiary education certificate. Finally, level of income was also divided into three categories (low, middle and high), each representing a third of the population in each country. This means that level of income is measured on a relative rather than an absolute scale.

In each chapter, the characteristics of a typical European concerning a specific value or attitude are given. For example, we show who are the most and least nationalistic, or who are the most trusting and mistrusting people in Europe. Such characteristics are based on the results of (logistic) regression analyses including the following features: gender, age, level of education, level of income, religious denomination, level of urbanisation, marital status, subjective health, and country of residence.

Special thanks

This Atlas of European Values would not have been possible without the cooperation of many. First of all, we would like to thank all European Values Study partners for collecting, preparing, archiving, and documenting the data: the national programme directors in the European countries, and the EVS teams at Tilburg University and CESIS/ZACIS in Cologne. A central team monitored the translation process by means of the Translation Management Tool (TMT), developed by CentERdata at Tilburg University (Tilburg).

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The organisation of the European Values Study responsible for the 2017 Data Collection for the current team composition, see www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/about-evs/organization

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Country abbreviations

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Do Europeans really feel European? Do they look at the future with confidence or concern? Do they trust each other, and do they show solidarity? How do they think about migration and the refugee influx? Do they want a greener Europe, and at what cost? Are democracy and human rights ingrained in Europe or are they eroding?

A new edition of the Atlas of European Values answers these and other questions related to pressing issues such as identity, welfare, migration, sustainability, solidarity and democracy in a visually attractive way. In this unique Atlas, the reader will find maps, charts and graphs based on high-quality survey data by the long-term comparative research project, the European Values Study, combined with data from other scientific sources. Texts on current social theories and interviews with European scientists and thinkers clarify the findings. The Atlas of European Values is your guide to understanding today’s Europe.