**Supplemental Materials for The Role of Digital Channels in Predicting Objective and Subjective Negotiation Outcomes**

This file includes:

* Additional details on New Recruit Negotiation
* Payoff schedules
* Role type effects

**New Recruit Negotiation**

The New Recruit negotiation requires pairs to negotiate job offer details for a new employee. One person in each pair plays the role of the recruiter while the other plays the role of the candidate. Pairs are required to negotiate eight issues with five different options for each issue. The eight issues include: salary, start date, bonus, moving expense, vacation, insurance, job assignment, and location. Of these eight issues, two are distributive issues where parties have opposite preferences—in this case, for salary and start date. Four are integrative issues where parties value outcomes differentially—bonus and moving expenses (which are valued more by the candidate) and insurance and vacation (which are valued more by the recruiter). Finally, two are compatible issues where parties have the same preference (location and job assignment). In this negotiation, the recruiter and the candidate have their own point schedules that explicitly highlight their relative preferences within and between issues (see below for a detailed description of the point schedules for recruiters and candidates).

**Payoff Schedule – Distributive Issues**

**For Recruiters**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Salary | $90,000 | -6000 |
|  | $88,000 | -4500 |
|  | $86,000 | -3000 |
|  | $84,000 | -1500 |
|  | $82,000 | 0 |
| Starting Date | June 1 | 0 |
|  | June 15 | 600 |
|  | July 1 | 1200 |
|  | July 15 | 1800 |
|  | August 1 | 2400 |

**For Candidates**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Salary | $90,000 | 0 |
|  | $88,000 | -1500 |
|  | $86,000 | -3000 |
|  | $84,000 | -4500 |
|  | $82,000 | -6000 |
| Starting Date | June 1 | 2400 |
|  | June 15 | 1800 |
|  | July 1 | 1200 |
|  | July 15 | 600 |
|  | August 1 | 0 |

**Payoff Schedule – Integrative Issues**

**For Recruiters**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Bonus | 10% | 0 |
|  | 8% | 400 |
|  | 6% | 800 |
|  | 4% | 1200 |
|  | 2% | 1600 |
| Vacation | 25 days | 0 |
|  | 20 days | 1000 |
|  | 15 days | 2000 |
|  | 10 days | 3000 |
|  | 5 days | 4000 |
| Moving Expense Coverage | 100% | 0 |
|  | 90% | 200 |
|  | 80% | 400 |
|  | 70% | 600 |
|  | 60% | 800 |
| Insurance Coverage | Plan A | 0 |
|  | Plan B | 800 |
|  | Plan C | 1600 |
|  | Plan D | 2400 |
|  | Plan E | 3200 |

**For Candidates**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Bonus | 10% | 4000 |
|  | 8% | 3000 |
|  | 6% | 2000 |
|  | 4% | 1000 |
|  | 2% | 0 |
| Vacation | 25 days | 1600 |
|  | 20 days | 1200 |
|  | 15 days | 800 |
|  | 10 days | 400 |
|  | 5 days | 0 |
| Moving Expense Coverage | 100% | 3200 |
|  | 90% | 2400 |
|  | 80% | 1600 |
|  | 70% | 800 |
|  | 60% | 0 |
| Insurance Coverage | Plan A | 800 |
|  | Plan B | 600 |
|  | Plan C | 400 |
|  | Plan D | 200 |
|  | Plan E | 0 |

**Payoff Schedule – Compatible Issues**

**For Recruiters**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Location | New York | 0 |
|  | Boston | 300 |
|  | Chicago | 600 |
|  | Atlanta | 900 |
|  | San Francisco | 1200 |
| Job Assignment | Division E | -2400 |
|  | Division D | -1800 |
|  | Division C | -1200 |
|  | Division B | -600 |
|  | Division A | 0 |

**For Candidates**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Options | Points |
| Location | New York | 0 |
|  | Boston | 300 |
|  | Chicago | 600 |
|  | Atlanta | 900 |
|  | San Francisco | 1200 |
| Job Assignment | Division E | -2400 |
|  | Division D | -1800 |
|  | Division C | -1200 |
|  | Division B | -600 |
|  | Division A | 0 |

**Role Type Effects for Experiment 1**

***Objective outcomes.*** We report role type effects for the outcomes reported in main text. We conducted a linear mixed-model analysis using team ID as the subject variable to account for potential group-level differences, role type (recruiter versus candidate) as the independent variable, and medium type (video versus synchronous text) as a covariate for all outcomes. There was no significant effect of role type on total points on integrative issues, (*MRecruiter* = 6996.49, *SD* = 1170.77; *MCandidate* = 6249.12, *SD* = 1446.32), *F*(1, 110) = .011, *p* = .92). Furthermore, there was no significant effect of role type on total individual points across issues, (*MRecruiter* = 6722.81, *SD* = 1910.97; *MCandidate* = 5249.12, *SD* = 2169.68), *F*(1, 110) = 1.94, *p* = .17).

***Subjective outcomes.*** We conducted a linear mixed-model analysis using team ID as the subject variable to account for potential group-level differences, role type (recruiter versus candidate) as the independent variable, and medium type (video versus synchronous text) as a covariate for all outcomes. There were no effects of role type on participants’ satisfaction with outcome (*Mrecruiter* = 4.52, *SD* = 1.48; *Mcandidate* = 4.24, *SD* = 1.30; *F*(1, 127) = 2.58, *p* = .11), participants’ satisfaction with process (*Mrecruiter* = 4.91, *SD* = 1.58; *Mcandidate* = 4.64, *SD* = 1.49; *F*(1, 127) = .59, *p* = .44), or participants’ enjoyment of the process (*Mrecruiter* = 5.43, *SD* = 1.61; *Mcandidate* = 5.48, *SD* = 1.56; *F*(1, 127) = .23, *p* = .63).

Similarly, we observed no effects of role type on participants’ perceptions of their partner (*Mrecruiter* = 5.95, *SD* = 1.12; *Mcandidate* = 5.79, *SD* = 1.27; *F*(1, 127) = 2.01, *p* = .16), participants’ perceptions of the extent to which they liked their partner (*Mrecruiter* = 5.95, *SD* = 1.29; *Mcandidate* = 5.83, *SD* = 1.27; *F*(1, 127) = .30, *p* = .59), and their willingness to negotiate again with the same partner (*Mrecruiter* = 5.55, *SD* = 1.45; *Mcandidate* = 5.55, *SD* = 1.41; *F*(1, 127) = .14, *p* = .71). Participants’ assessment of their own cooperation was marginally higher for those in the candidate role (*M* = 4.75, *SD* = 1.09) relative to those in the recruiter role (*M* = 4.43, *SD* = 1.16; *F*(1, 127) = 3.45, *p* = .07), and there was no significant difference in participants’ assessment of their partner’s cooperation (*Mrecruiter* = 4.45, *SD* = 1.18; *Mcandidate* = 4.06, *SD* = 1.24; *F*(1, 127) = 2.24, *p* = .14). Participants’ assessments of their ability to read their partner varied significantly by role type (*Mrecruiter* = 4.17, *SD* = 1.42; *Mcandidate* = 3.79, *SD* = 1.40; *F*(1, 127) = 8.04, *p* = .005).

**Role Type Effects for Experiment 2**

***Effects of role type***

***Objective outcomes.*** We report role type effects for the outcomes reported in main text. We conducted a linear mixed-model analysis using team ID as the subject variable to account for potential group-level differences, role type (recruiter versus candidate) as the independent variable, and medium type (video versus synchronous text) as a covariate for all outcomes. Results revealed that there were no significant differences in total points on integrative issues for participants in the candidate role (*M* = 6270.83, *SD* = 1585.84) relative to those in the recruiter role (*M* = 6450, *SD* = 1467.09), *F*(1, 92) = .97, *p* = .33. However, participants’ total individual points across all issues was higher for those in the recruiter role (*M* = 6537.50, *SD* = 1897.99) relative to those in the candidate role (*M* = 4808.33, *SD* = 2119.69), *F*(1, 92) = 7.88, *p* = .006.

***Subjective outcomes.*** We conducted a linear mixed-model analysis using team ID as the subject variable to account for potential group-level differences, role type (recruiter versus candidate) as the independent variable, and medium type (video versus synchronous text) as a covariate for all outcomes. Results revealed that participants in the recruiter role were more satisfied with the outcome than those in the candidate role (*Mrecruiter* = 4.52, *SD* = 1.51; *Mcandidate* = 3.69, *SD* = 1.65; *F*(1, 109) = 9.64, *p* = .002). There was also a significant difference in participants’ satisfaction with process, such that recruiters were more satisfied with the process than candidates (*Mrecruiter* = 4.74, *SD* = 1.63; *Mcandidate* = 4.13, *SD* = 1.75; *F*(1, 109) = 5.01, *p* = .03), and a significant difference in participants’ enjoyment of the process, such that recruiters reported enjoying the process more than candidates (*Mrecruiter* = 5.16, *SD* = 1.62; *Mcandidate* = 4.42, *SD* = 2.03; *F*(1, 109) = 5.50, *p* = .02).

There was a marginal difference between conditions in participants’ perceptions of their partner (*Mrecruiter* = 5.66, *SD* = 1.33; *Mcandidate* = 5.47, *SD* = 1.45; *F*(1, 109) = 3.29, *p* = .07). Participants in the recruiter role reported liking their partners more than those in the candidate role (*Mrecruiter* = 5.66, *SD* = 1.38; *Mcandidate* = 5.40, *SD* = 1.51; *F*(1, 109) = 4.90, *p* = .03), and those in the recruiter role also indicated a greater willingness to negotiate again with the same partner (*Mrecruiter* = 5.43, *SD* = 1.27; *Mcandidate* = 5.02, *SD* = 1.56; *F*(1, 109) = 4.82, *p* = .03). There was a marginal difference in participants’ assessment of their own cooperation (*Mcandidate* = 4.74, *SD* = 1.15; *Mrecruiter* = 4.17, *SD* = 1.34; *F*(1, 109) = 3.07, *p* = .08). There was a significant difference in participants’ assessments of their partner’s cooperation (*Mrecruiter*= 4.47, *SD* = 1.17; *Mcandidate* = 4.11, *SD* = 1.41; *F*(1, 109) = 8.39, *p* = .005). Participants’ assessments of their ability to read their partner also varied by role type (*Mrecruiter* = 4.02, *SD* = 1.60; *Mcandidate* = 3.65, *SD* = 1.86; *F*(1, 109) = 5.17, *p* = .03).